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Abstract
Gracefully recovering from software and hardware faults is important to en-
suring highly reliable and available systems. Operating systems have privi-
leged access to all aspects of system operation, thus a fault related to them
is able to affect the entire system. Existing approaches to operating system
recovery either do not protect the entire system or require a completely new
operating system design.
This dissertation presents a new approach to fault recovery in operat-
ing systems called Recovery Domains. This approach allows recovery from
unanticipated faults in commodity operating systems. Recovery is organized
around the concept of a dynamic request. Operating system entry points ini-
tiate requests to perform some action. System calls, for example, are a request
by an application to the operating system. When a fault is detected, the re-
covery system rolls back the effects of the offending recovery domain while
leaving the remainder of the system running. To ensure that the entire system
(including the state of other concurrent kernel threads) remains consistent
after the rollback, dependencies between domains are tracked as the system
runs. When rolling back a faulting domain, any other domains that were de-
pendent on the it, because of data-flow between the domains, are rolled back
and restarted.
Recovery Domains do not make faults transparent. Request failures are
reported to the requester. This visibility allows handling of faults which are
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permanent: those faults which would reoccur if the request were retried. Re-
covery Domains also handle timing and transient faults.
Recovery Domains require compiler support to instrument the system.
The necessary support is simple, but can cause unnecessarily large system
overhead. This dissertation describes several performance improvements to
Recovery Domains based on dynamic analysis of the system state and static
analysis of memory regions, allocators, and locks. Runtime analysis of the
inter-dependence of the active requests can allow reduced tracking of state
changes. The recovery compiler can reason about memory regions and data
structures protected by a lock to eliminate instrumentation on many opera-
tions to locked memory. “Fresh” heap objects, those objects which have been
allocated and have not yet become visible to other requests and threads, re-
quire no instrumentation. These improvements to the recovery runtime and
compiler provide substantial performance improvements over more simple
implementations.
This dissertation describes the goals, approach, semantics, and program-
ming model of Recovery Domains; the minimal implementation of the run-
time and compiler; the static analysis and optimization at the compiler level
and dynamic optimization to the runtime; and the porting of two signifi-
cantly different versions of the Linux kernel to the recovery system. It eval-
uates the overhead, effectiveness, and coverage of recovery. Finally it de-
scribes the potential integration of a model fault detector with the Recovery
Domains system.
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Recovery and continued correct execution of software a system in the event
of a fault has been sought for decades as a means to increase the reliability
of these systems. As our dependence on software becomes more pervasive,
software faults have a greater impact on our personal lives, our economies,
our health, our safety, and our infrastructures. Reducing or nullifying the
effects of failures is therefore quite desirable.
Operating systems form the heart of modern software stacks. In most ar-
eas, only a handful of commodity operating systems are in use. Desktop and
server operating systems, for example, are commodities with estimates of the
top three operating system families (Linux, Mac OS X, and Windows 2000
and later) covering around 96% of the market [98, 100]. Even in the spe-
cialized area of supercomputers, one commodity operating system, Linux,
is found on 443 of the top 500 supercomputers [101]. The pervasiveness of a
few operating systems gives common sets of bugs and vulnerabilities to many
machines performing many varied functions and running many different ap-
plications. A fault that can be triggered in an operating system will affect a
more diverse and larger set of users than a fault in a database or in presenta-
tion software.
Operating systems are also highly privileged, thus a breach in the OS be-
comes a breach in all applications running on the OS. Operating systems, due
to their control of system resources and management of many security mea-
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sures, have unfettered access to the state of anything running on them. This
privileged state, while necessary, amplifies the effect and potential disruption
of faults.
Operating systems provide a common and complex foundation for soft-
ware systems. As such, they serve as a common failure point for a diverse
range of systems. Fail they do [32]. Analysis of one mobile phone operating
system shows that individual users experience an operating system failure ev-
ery 11 days [19]. Operating system failures are blamed for problems ranging
from the 2007 London Stock Exchange failure to regular crashes experienced
by users [31].
The availability of computational power is steadily increasing, both in
the low-end, consumer-system space, such as home routers, cell phones, and
set-top boxes, as well as in the traditional desktop computing space. Some
of this computational power can be used to improve the user’s experience
with the devices by improving reliability thus preventing frustrating crashes.
Reliability is, in fact, already pushed by some vendors as a differentiating
feature of their system (e.g. Apple, HP, Cisco, IBM, etc), showing a general
market interest in more reliable systems.
Since operating systems are foundational to a system’s stability and are
integral to limiting the impact of faults in programs run on the system, the
ability to recover from faults is especially important to creating and main-
taining a reliable system.
The primary traditional approaches to recovering from faults in the op-
erating system focus on drivers and, to a lesser extent, dynamically loaded
extensions. Recovering from faults in drivers, such as in [78, 77, 95], is based
on isolation, logging, and interposing on the communication between drivers
and the rest of the kernel. Other systems, such as [69], use similar techniques
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to protect the kernel against arbitrary dynamically loaded extensions.
Existing approaches do not address entire operating systems. Focusing on
drivers and extensions leaves the majority of the code in an operating system
unprotected from faults. In fact, errors in the core of commodity operating
systems are especially difficult to recover from since such systems are in-
herently multi-threaded, handle resources shared between many clients (viz.,
user processes), have extensive asynchronous internal behavior, and directly
interface to hardware.
This dissertation proposes an organizing principle for recovery called
Recovery Domains that enables complex multi-threaded systems to recover
from run-time faults in nearly all components. Recovery Domains have
strong recovery semantics yet minimal and localized effects in the event that
recovery is triggered. Recovery domains are easy for programmers to add
to a system and require few changes to existing source code. The semantics
are such that they can be easily analyzed and manipulated by a compiler
or automated tool. Recovery Domains are a general mechanism capable of
handling very demanding multi-threaded, state intensive, request-oriented
software structures.
Recovery Domains do not require rewriting an operating system in a
different style, such as as a microkernel, as some existing approaches do,
such as [42, 68, 7, 6]. Nor do they only protect portions of the kernel, as
in [95, 77, 69]. Further, they don’t require a change in implementation lan-
guage to one which is type-safe, as required by [42, 68]. Being able to protect
an existing, entire kernel without significant changes in structure or language
sets this work apart from exist approaches to operating system recovery.
As discussed in Chapter 6, Recovery Domains provide a high rate of fault
recovery with only a couple of hundred lines of code changed in or added
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to the original kernel. Recovery succeeded for an average of 33 consecutive
injected random faults. Performance, with static and dynamic optimizations,
is very good, often with less than 10% overhead. Low runtime overhead
and low programmer overhead make Recovery Domains an attractive way to
provide full-kernel fault recovery.
1.1 Research Contributions of this Dissertation
This work, broadly, contributes a new approach to the recovery of request-
oriented systems. This approach is applied to commodity operating systems,
potentially allowing significant improvements in reliability for real-world
systems. The high-level contributions of this dissertation are:
• A new request-oriented recovery mechanism with simple, powerful,
and easy to understand semantics.
• A simple to use interface for programmers to add recovery capabilities
to their systems with little effort.
• A set of compiler transformations to introduce recovery into systems.
• An implementation of the recovery mechanism which supports the re-
covering of operating systems.
• An investigation of the effectiveness, overheads, and programmer com-
plexity of introducing recovery into a commodity operating system,
namely, Linux.
• The use of inter-procedural analysis of memory regions to reduce the
overhead of recovery.
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• The use of runtime analysis of the system to reduce the recovery over-
head.
1.2 Dissertation Organization
Chapter 2 provides the motivation and high-level considerations in designing
operating system recovery. Chapter 3 describes Recovery Domains, focusing
on the fundamental approach, concepts, and structures. Chapter 4 describes
a complete implementation of Recovery Domains, the experience of port-
ing Linux 2.4.22. Chapter 5 describes the addition of several optimizations
based on compiler analysis and runtime analysis and the experience porting
Linux 2.6.27. Chapter 6 provides performance, survivability, and coverage
results. Chapter 7 uses Secure Virtual Architecture’s [21] memory safety tool
as a model fault detector and shows how it would be modified to use Recov-
ery Domains when a memory fault is detected. Chapter 8 places this work
in the context of other recovery systems and recovery techniques. Finally,
chapter 9 concludes the work.
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Chapter 2
Operating System Recovery
Recovering from faults in operating systems presents many challenges. We
discuss these before moving to enumerating the most desirable qualities of an
ideal recovery system. To address those challenges and to meet those ideals,
we present the unifying organization: requests.
2.1 Challenges of Operating System Recovery
Recovering from faults in operating systems has several unique challenges
in addition to the challenges of recovering from faults in general software
systems. The challenges of operating system recovery come from several
sources:
• Their inherent multi-threaded nature;
• Their low-level operation;
• Their rich functionality and complexity; and
• The pragmatics of commodity system.
Modern operating systems are inherently multi-threaded. A recovery sys-
tem for operating systems must be able to navigate the many threads poten-
tially executing simultaneously on multiple processors and recover the sys-
tem to a consistent state across all threads and processors.
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Due to the low-level nature of the system which is being recovered, the
recovery system itself must be self-standing; it must not rely on the oper-
ating system. Since the operating system must run on top of the recovery
runtime, minimal dependencies should exist from the recovery system run-
time to the operating system. Ideally the recovery system’s data should not
be corruptible by the OS. This can be achieved by having the OS running
with such memory safety guarantees as would pro-actively prevent it from
accessing the recovery system’s runtime data. An example using of a memory
fault detector which provides these guarantees is given in Chapter 7.
The operating system is also low-level due to it interacting with and con-
trolling of hardware. Through these interactions, it interacts with the outside
world. The recovery system must gracefully interact with the real world and
other software. This primarily means that it should have a clear semantic on
the effects of recovery on hardware device state.
A system to recover from operating-system-level faults needs to be able to
handle the wide range of activities that an OS engages in on behalf of requests
from its clients. An operating system has a large exposed surface available to
malicious or buggy entities: the system call API, the network, and all hard-
ware devices. Each of these, and others, has a distinct entry point into the
kernel and interacts with kernel state in ways that are sometimes unique to
their role. This large exposed surface comes from the many functions the
operating system must perform, from processing network packets to inter-
acting with block devices to handling timers to creating abstractions such as
file-systems. This large surface imposes many paths into the kernel and many
potential interactions between entities which a recovery system must be able
to handle.
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Operating systems, especially those in wide deployment, represent the re-
sults of significant engineering efforts. There seems to be little enthusiasm in
the commercial realm to re-architect an existing operating system with either
a new organization or in a new language which allows for easier recovery.
Thus, a practical recovery system must fit within the common architectures
for operating systems and make modest demands of the programmers with
respect to changes in the operating system structure.
Code does not exist in a causally isolated bubble, nor is it common that
all code running on a machine uses the recovery system. Hence the recovery
system must deal with events, code, and operations that are outside the realm
of recovery. It should allow, where external code is appropriately structured,
the programmer to annotate external interfaces to allow proper restoration of
a sane state to the external component.
Designing the semantics of recovery is in itself a major challenge. The
semantics must be strong enough to allow automatic recovery; the semantics
must require minimal design changes in the operating system; the seman-
tics must be natural enough for programmers to easily comprehend; and the
semantics must be possible to implement. These and other conditions are dis-
cussed in more detail in Chapter 2.2. The semantics dictate how threads inter-
act, how requests interact, how requests are tracked across thread boundaries,
how irreversible actions are dealt with, and in what state the system is left af-
ter recovery. Compelling levels of recovery require a recovery system which
specifies in an easily understood way what the system will look like after a
recovery. This allows the programmers to know how to have the system con-
tinue operating after recovery events. Semantics must be designed which can
allow a programmer to succinctly specify recovery for an operating system
kernel which is useful to the programmer and can handle the many corner
8
cases of complex, multi-threaded, legacy operating systems, while still allow-
ing an implementation which can be understood. Recovery is not an event
one wants to fail, so trust in the implementation is important; thus the com-
plexity of semantics is at odds with the simplicity and, to some extent, the
trustworthiness of an implementation.
Performance and correctness are also important and intertwined chal-
lenges of this work. The amount of performance degradation that is accept-
able depends on how well the recovery mechanism works, how often the
recovery system is employed, the size of the vulnerable surface of the target
system, and the requirements for availability of the target system. That said,
correctness is a must. The recovery system must not change the semantics
of the program when it is operating fault-free. These two characteristics are
intertwined. The recovery system must do work to enable a recovery to hap-
pen, and this work must happen during normal, fault-free execution. The
challenge is to minimize the overhead incurred during fault-free execution
to enable recovery. Care must be taken in the design and implementation of
both the compiler transformation and the runtime to ensure correct and ef-
ficient execution and correct recovery. This includes not reordering memory
accesses, respecting locks, and not deferring or batching recovery work if that
would introduce a window of time during which recovery in another thread
would cause undefined behavior.
2.2 The Ideal Recovery System
The ideal recovery system for recovery of faults in existing, common, de-
ployed operating system has several enumerable properties. Among the most
important are:
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Automatic recovery: Recovery should be executed completely by the re-
covery system without intervention by the operating system, though
some fault detector which triggers a recovery may be used.
For the entire system: Recovery should be possible from any part of the op-
erating system, not just specific subsystems or drivers.
No porting effort: Use of the recovery system should require no porting
effort by the operating system programmer to enable recovery.
For commodity systems: The recovery system should work for widely de-
ployed existing operating systems.
Recover from detected errors of any type: Recovery should not be special-
ized to a particular type or class of error. It should be possible to re-
cover from any detected fault.
Recovery not usable as a denial of service: Recovery runs the risk of being
usable as an avenue for denial of service attacks by repeated recovery
and re-execution of a fault. Recovery systems should be designed so
that they cannot cause a denial of service.
Clear semantics: Programmers should know what will happen when recov-
ery is triggered. The semantics should be simple, intuitive, and useful
to programmers.
2.3 The System Model: Requests
To make an effective recovery system, it is first necessary to define a model of
system structure. The key insight is that a request-oriented view of recovery
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for a system allows novel solutions more powerful than previous work. Re-
quests enter the system through well defined points. Processing of a request
by the system may cross traditional sub-system and thread boundaries. Re-
quests may issue requests to other parts of system in the course of processing
an outside request.
We start with a request oriented system model which allows greater flex-
ibility than previous work. Systems have been modeled in previous work in
three major ways:
As a collection of state: In this model, the memory and open resources rep-
resent the running system and are periodically backed-up in a check-
point; recovered precedes by using the checkpoint to restore the entire
system state.
As a subset of state and sub-systems: In this model, state is tied to a sub-
system, or, more generally, an object or set of objects and the code
which operate on them. These sub-systems of the system are recovered
independently by restarting them (and in some cases restoring some
persistent state for that sub-system).
With no model: Systems lack a model but have an ad-hoc approach in which
recovery happens by the programmer’s error handlers (either supported
in the language, e.g. exceptions, or by error values).
Request-orientation allow the recovery entity to more closely match the
structure and logical operation of many systems. Requests subsume recovery
of well engineered sub-systems; an entry into the sub-system is a request.
Concurrent requests are separately recoverable, even within the same sub-
system as it is the requests which are the entity of recovery, not the sub-
system.
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Request-oriented recovery also seems an intuitive match to a program-
mer’s notion of system behavior, thus matching the recovery mechanism
more closely to the system architecture while providing stronger guaran-
tees than either exceptions or ad-hoc recovery. Applications make requests
of an operating system: requests to open a file, requests to read or write
through a file descriptor, requests to open a socket, and requests for memory
pages. Many protocols are structured as requests. The SMTP definition [45]
describes email transport as a series of commands and replies: “The server
responds to each command with a reply”; this is a request oriented system
where the requests are the commands. The HTTP definition [28] explicitly
uses the language of requests. Similar arguments can be made for FTP [59],
SSH [92, 90, 93, 91], CORBA [39], and many other network protocols.
TCP [58] and IP [57] can both be seen as describing a request-based sys-
tem between machines. In applications, libraries provide services that can
be viewed as requests: malloc to allocate memory, printf to write to the
console, rand to get a random number, and qsort to have an array sorted.
Toolkits are a set of requests between the application and the toolkit. In Qt,
the toolkit sends a “QEvent” to handlers in the application. This is a request
to process some action, such as a mouse move. Applications send the toolkit
requests to paint the screen, etc. Requests appear everywhere you look in the
software stack, from protocol specification to interfacing with a hardware
device.
2.4 Design Space
The design space of recovery is large. Recovery Domains pick out an aggres-
sive, but still practical, point in this space.
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The first design choice is whether faults are visible to the system. We
choose to make faults visible to one thread, but invisible to the rest of the
system. We do this to enable the handling of faults which are permanent.
Reporting the fault to the requester allows us to avoid automatic re-execution
of the fault. The rest of the system is see system state “as-if” the fault never
occurred.
The second design choice is what recovery happens in the event of a fault.
Options used by other systems range from restoring the full system to a pre-
vious point to simply transferring control. We restore the system state which
is tainted by a fault, but leave the rest of the system alone. This allows some
threads to make forward progress in the event of a fault.
In operating system recovery, an important design choice is what com-
ponents of the system should be recoverable. Most approaches choose just
drivers or dynamic extensions. While this can narrow the interfaces which
the recovery system must deal with, it leaves parts of the system unprotected.
We target the entire operating system with Recovery Domains. We want to
recover from faults in as many locations as is feasible.
An important choice in design is what language to support or require.
Use of type-safe languages can simplify recovery and are required by some
recovery systems. We choose to support operating systems written in C (and
any other compiled language) to enable recovery for most existing operating
systems.
Finally, the design of recovery requires choosing the an architecture for
the operating system. Many whole operating system recovery systems use
micro-kernels. These often have cleaner interfaces, better isolation between
components, and allow more fine-grained restart of components. We do not
require a particular architecture. Although all the advantages with micro-
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kernels in regard to recovery do apply to Recovery Domains, we do not de-
pend on this. To have a practical system for commodity systems we support
classic monolithic kernels.
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Chapter 3
Recovery Domains
Recovery Domains, while not specific to operating systems, are designed to
operate in systems with specific patterns. Recovery Domains are organized
around the notion of a request as discussed in more detail in section 3.2.
Within this over-arching framework, many substantively different imple-
mentations are possible.
This chapter explains the basis, goals, and semantics of recovery domains
independent of a specific implementation. It discusses the types of domains,
what they intend to cover, how execution is paired to domains, and how
programmers are meant to interact with the system.
3.1 Concepts and Terms
This, and subsequent chapters, make use of the terms listed below. These
terms will be explained in more detail in latter sections.
Recovery: The restoration of an erroneous state of the system to one which
is acceptable.
Request: An operation performed on behalf of another entity. The other
entity may be either software or hardware.
Requester: The entity issuing a request.
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Request-oriented System: A system whose actions or computations are
largely initiated by outside events and entities.
Fault Detector: Language or runtime features, compiler instrumentation,
programmer inserted checks, or other sources of logic which detect the
runtime violation of a desired constraint.
Recovery Domain: The runtime entity containing information about a re-
quest, including control-flow information, state changes, and data-flow
between requests
Recovery Event: An invocation of the recovery system to perform a recov-
ery, usually at the request of a fault detector.
Context-Independent Request: A request which does not depend on the
state of the requester; the relevant and modified state is private to the
request in that it is not accessed by the requester.
Recovery Execution: Execution under the control of the recovery system
after a fault is triggered but before control is returned to the system.
Recoverable Domain: A domain is recoverable if the system can recover
from an error during the execution of the domain.
Parent Domain: The domain that is executing when the entry point of a new
domain, D, is reached and D begins execution. By definition, the parent
domain will be in the same thread.
Ancestor Domains: The set of domains reachable through the parent rela-
tionship.
Sub-request: A request make in the course of processing another, existing
request.
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Commit: The transition of speculative state, state which has been changed
based on conditional operations, to permanent state, state which is
not dependent on conditional operations. A commit indicates that the
condition is resolved and the operations dependent on that condition
should have and did execute.
Output-commit: A state change which cannot be undone since it or its ef-
fects are visible to the outside environment, e.g. network activity, writes
to storage, or changes to the display.
Error Virtualization: The use of a preexisting, programmer-defined type of
error in place of an error defined by a fault detector which is not in the
original system.
Dependency Tracking: Monitoring and recording data-flow of speculative
values between requests to establish a partial commit ordering.
3.2 Recovery System Organization:
Request-Oriented Systems
The key organizing principle of this recovery system is the concept of a
request. A request, in this sense, is an operation in the software that per-
forms some action on behalf of another entity, even if that other entity is the
software itself. Making a request is an explicit invocation of the operation.
Sources of requests may be internal to a specific piece of software or come
from other software or hardware. Hardware tends to make requests through
interrupts, though not exclusively. Software uses interrupts, function calls,
and privilege-changing instruction (such as “Call Gates” on the Intel 386).
Although, arguably, every instruction is a request to hardware and every line
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of code is a request (or several requests) to change the state of the system, we
focus on higher-level requests than these.
Recovery is tied to requests for the simple reason that they correspond
to high-level semantics of many programs. Hence request-oriented recovery
is both easy to reason about by programmers and does not require complex
mapping by the compiler from existing code to recovery entities.
Request-oriented systems, those whose executions are largely driven by
outside entities, are a common software organization structure. This struc-
ture arises fairly naturally due to either the nature of the software or modular
engineering. Operating systems and server software, such as database servers
and web servers, are often explicitly request oriented. Broad use of libraries
cause most systems to have substantial request-oriented internal communica-
tion. Graphical user interfaces, for example, have at their heart an event loop
that translates user requests (e.g. a mouse click) into a request of the applica-
tion (e.g. saving a file). An HTTP server sends files to clients in response to
requests from those clients.
Requests themselves may make requests in the course of processing. This
arises from the notion of a module or sub-system. A sub-system provides
an external interface used by the larger system to issue requests to the sub-
system. These sub-requests may cross thread boundaries (such as putting a
request on a work queue). Besides their important contribution in helping
programmer to manage the complexity of large systems, sub-systems and
their interfaces improve the granularity of recovery by reducing the scope
of execution tainted by a fault.
In operating systems, requests come from three sources. The first source
is system calls. These are calls into the operating system by applications
requesting some operation be done. This is a quintessential example of a
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request-oriented system. The second source of requests is interrupts. These
are requests by hardware for attention. In the course of processing either of
these request types, operating systems may make internal requests. This is
the third source of requests. For example, an open system call will make sev-
eral internal requests: looking up an i-node in a cache, allocating resources,
checking permissions, etc. These internal requests come out of the structure
of the operating system.
Server software has a model similar to operating systems, receiving its re-
quest from sockets instead of system calls. The exposed layer of many servers
makes viewing the system from a request oriented standpoint straightfor-
ward.
General software, especially event driven software, often has substantial
portions that are request-oriented. This type of software is not the focus of
this dissertation, but may often be amenable to using Recovery Domains.
Graphical applications have, either internally or in a library, an event loop
that dispatches events, such as keystrokes or mouse clicks, to appropriate
handlers. Events can be viewed as requests in such a system. Libraries create
a natural request layer due to the modular design. Calls into most libraries
are natural internal requests. This includes basic resource allocation and deal-
location functions such as malloc and free as well as calls such as stringdup
and pthread_create. Function calls and object method invocations, as an
abstraction, map well, in most cases, to the notion of requests.
3.3 Requests Context
Requests exist within some context. This context primarily includes two fac-
tors. First, there may be a request which was already executing on the thread.
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This previous request must be preserved and restored after the completion of
the current request. It is not necessarily the case that the previously executing
request initiated the new request. Interrupts initiate new requests on a thread
which was already executing a different request. The second component of
the context, then, is why the request started. A request started explicitly by
another request is a sub-request. Requests from outside the system, such as
an interrupt or a signal are not sub-requests, even if there was a previously
executing request on that processor.
In the general case, sub-requests are dependent on the request which is-
sued them. If a request ends, its execution is still speculative if the requester
is speculative. However, a common structure, especially across sub-system
and library boundaries, is to have requests which are not dependent on the
state of the requester. These requests are to modules or sub-systems which
encapsulate their state well. The prime example of this is malloc. Malloc,
and functions like it, are isolated from the caller, revealing little or no infor-
mation about their internal state. We call these requests context-independent
requests.
Requests which represent an external entity forcibly transferring exe-
cution to a new request, as happens during an interrupt, are also context-
independent. Although a request may have been executing, the source of the
new request is an entity privileged enough to preempt the existing request
and have its request processed before returning to the existing request.
It is often the case when context-independent requests are sub-requests,
as it is in the case of malloc, that there are context-independent inverse ac-
tions. For malloc, it is free. This observation, which is not unique to this
dissertation, allows higher-level recovery at the semantic level of the requests
rather than at lower levels. This allows for more efficient and flexible imple-
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mentations of recovery.
3.4 Recovery Domains: the Runtime Entities
The basic unit of recovery is a recovery domain. All code executes within
some recovery domain. A recovery domain is an interval of execution de-
marcated by calls to the domain start and end operations. recovery domains
track which state changes are necessary to undo when recovering as well as
how data flows between requests. A recovery domain logically consists of:
Request entry point: This is the point at which the request starts and the
point at which a new recovery domain is created. This demarcation is
used as the point to which control returns in the event of a fault.
Request exit point: This is the point at which the request is complete. Con-
trol is returned to the requester and the recovery domain commits if it
is able and allowed to do so.
Recovery action: The programmer supplies an action to perform after re-
covery is initiated. This action is how a fault which is recovered from
is visible to the system. The most common action is to return an er-
ror code. Another useful option is to ignore the error (e.g. statistics
updates may not affect correctness and can be ignored if they fail).
Inverse action: The programmer may supply an action which semantically
undoes the effect of this request. A common example would be a
kmalloc request supplying kfree as an inverse action or vfs_open
supplying vfs_close. The recovery system may use the inverse action
to undo a request during recovery rather than directly restoring the
modified state.
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Dependent domains: Domains which have data dependencies, either read-
after-write or write-after-write, or are sub-requests of this domain are
dependent on this domain. If a domain must recover, all dependent
domains must be recovered and restarted. This ensures that data used
by domains is produced only by domains which did not fault.
Each recovery domain executes within a single thread. Cross-domain and
cross-thread dependencies are recorded. Dependencies are formed by mon-
itoring data flow from state modification to accesses by recovery domains.
recovery domains are not checkpoints: a rollback of one domain does not
imply a rollback of all domains or all threads. As explained below, recovery
domains may be nested to take advantage of existing error recovery paths and
code that has a semantic inverse.
There are five types of recovery domains. Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 summa-
rize the semantics of the five domain types. Because of the nature of the ker-
nel entry points, it is not possible to statically determine the type of domain
a request starts. Specifically, the domain type depends on both the declared
behavior of the request and the context in which the request is issuer.
3.4.1 Comparison to Transactions
A recovery domain is transaction-like in that it provides failure atomicity.
However, recovery domains are not a replacement for synchronization nor
are they transactions. They do not provide any isolation; requests can in-
teract in any legal way. No additional durability beyond what was already
present in the system is provided by recovery domains. Some consistency is
provided, but only to memory state; recovery domains cannot ensure con-
sistency of device state or of communication with external systems. While a
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Domain Types
(Recoverable?)
Semantics Example Use
Basic (Y) Forms dependencies with any
active domain as required, but
committing is dependent on
the commit of the parent.
Operations for which
the kernel already han-
dles failure, e.g., open
Reversible (Y) Has a known semantic inverse
operation that is sufficient for
rollback, i.e., ignoring inter-
nal state changes.
Allocators; reference
counts; not locks
Independent (Y) Same as basic but for opera-
tions which do not have a par-
ent.
System calls; inter-
rupts handlers
Transparent (Y) Upon Successful completion,
state changes ignored durring
rollback.
Operations whose
state changes do not
affect the correctness
of the kernel; e.g. LRU
numbering of pages,
disk cache read-ahead
policies
Unlogged (N) Forms no dependencies, but
tracks all writes to break de-
pendencies in other domains.
Interrupt handlers and
other device manipula-
tion code
Table 3.1: Primary Types of Domains
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Reverts state changes Y Y Y Y N
Recover dependent domains Y Y Y Y N
Ignores dependencies on parents N Y Y Y Y
On success, only log inverse N Y N N N
On success, trys to commit N Y Y Y N/A
Parent is aware of fault Y Y Y N N
May be deferred by the programmer Y N Y Y Y
Normally has a deferred inverse N Y N N N
Table 3.2: Differences in Domain Types
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transaction commits or aborts at completion, a recovery domain may exist af-
ter the request’s completion if it depends on speculative state (state modified
by other domains which have not committed yet). Since the processing of a
request can traverse threads, recovery domains may compose across threads.
3.4.2 Basic Recovery Domains
Basic domains are the most common unit of recovery. Basic domains are
intended for regions of execution that have existing error handling code at
their exit. In the event of a fault, basic domains are rolled back independent of
their parent and the request appears to fail in an expected way as specified by
the programmer. Control is returned to the parent at the domain entry point,
which can then handle the error as desired. Basic domains are the common
form of nested domains (sub-requests) that execute during the processing of
a request.
Basic domains participate fully in logging and interference tracking. Logi-
cally, these domains log all memory writes. This log contains all values which
must be restored in the event of a fault in the domain. Memory reads are
monitored to discover runtime data dependencies on other domains.
Basic domains fully participate in the interference tracking mechanism.
All reads of speculative values, i.e. values written by domains which have
not committed, form a dependency from the writer to the reader. Any value
written by a basic domain is speculative until it commits, hence most readers
of that value will form a dependency on the basic domain. The exceptions to
this last rule are due to the nature of some classes of readers, not to the nature
of basic domains.
Basic domains do not commit on normal completion. Instead, their log
and dependencies are merged with those of their parent, thus passing on the
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responsibility for committing state to their parent. This commit behavior is
similar to that of “closed nested” transactions in the transactional memory lit-
erature [80] but, like all recovery domains, a key difference from transactions
is that they are never rolled back during normal execution.
Basic domains are for sub-requests. If a basic domain is used as an entry-
point into the kernel, the domain is considered an independent recovery do-
main which is discussed next.
3.4.3 Independent Recovery Domains
Independent domains handle requests which represent a new entry into the
system. A system call is a common request which will normally be handled as
an independent domain. These domains serve as a hard border between por-
tions of the system (e.g. user space and kernel space). Not all entry-points
are statically independent domains. A system call from an application rep-
resents a new request, say sys_open, whereas that same system call could be
issued by the kernel in the processing of a different request, say sys_exec.
Such a request is not an independent request when issued from another re-
quest because it is a sub-request; it is only part of the handling of an existing
request.
Independent domains differ from basic domains primarily in how they in-
teract with their ancestors and when they commit. Independent domains en-
capsulate local, context-free requests. This is to say that something declared
as an independent domain is assumed to be free of dependencies on its calling
context. It is not assumed that an independent domain is free of dependen-
cies on domains executing in other threads. For example, a alloc_page in the
Linux kernel is a basic allocator which is encapsulated with an independent
request. A request by one thread to alloc_page may from dependencies on
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a concurrently executing request to free_pages since both requests modify
the same free-list. Hence an independent domain does not form dependencies
on its thread-local ancestor domains, but does interact fully with the depen-
dency mechanism with respect to all other threads.
Because it does not form dependencies on its ancestors, an independent
domain may commit as soon as it completes if all its dependencies have com-
mitted. If an independent domain can not complete immediately, its caller
forms a dependency on it. This means that if another thread on which the
independent domain is dependent aborts, hence causing the independent do-
main to abort, the caller domain will also abort. In normal operation, this
window is expected to be short, thus allowing the independent domain to
commit quickly reducing the amount of speculative state tracked at runtime.
3.4.4 Semantically Reversible Recovery Domains
Reversible domains exist for operations for which a semantic inverse action
can be defined, independent of the context in which it was called. This inde-
pendence means, most importantly, that two such operations (on the same or
different threads) can be performed or rolled back independent of the other (in
the absence of an internal fault within one of the domains). This is referred
to as the context-independence property.
For example, two calls to kmalloc (in Linux) may both update common
internal allocator state, producing an apparent dependence, but at the level of
the logical allocations, there is no dependence: either one can be performed
or rolled back independent of the other. Furthermore, this rollback can be
performed by any thread: it simply needs to have the address of the allocated
memory. Many counters, including reference counting operations on heap
objects, are also important cases of reversible domains. Like allocations, these
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operations are extremely frequent, and create spurious dependencies between
domains. They can be treated as reversible domains because (a) the inverse for
an increment is simply a decrement, and vice versa, and (b) two operations on
the same counter in two different domains (in the same or different threads)
can be independently committed or rolled back.
When a reversible operation is complete, it can commit ignoring any de-
pendencies on its parent. This optimization greatly reduces the number of
interdependent domains that must be committed together or rolled back to-
gether on an error. For example, many concurrent allocations would become
interdependent and cause their invoking threads to be dependent on each
other, when in fact, at a semantic level, the context-independence property
ensures that the operations can be committed independently of their parents.
Reversible domains perform all the state and dependency tracking of an
independent and basic domain so internal faultswithin the domain can be de-
tected and recovered from. On a fault, just the reversible domain and any de-
pendent domain (such as multiple overlapping calls to an allocator) are rolled
back. The recovery action, such as returning an error code, is executed.
However, on the successful completion of a reversible domain, the state
changes by that domain are committed and the inverse action is logged with
the parent. If the parent must rollback, this inverse action will be called
to logically undo the operation of the reversible domain. So for example,
a malloc will be logged and if the domain calling malloc aborts, freewill be
called on the allocated object. In principle, internal logging is optional and for
well tested and trusted code could be turned off by the programmer to im-
prove performance, although the recovery domain implementation presented
here leaves it on and a domain type for this type of behavior is not defined.
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1 void foo(void* ptr) {
...
// Use ptr
...
free(ptr);
6 ...
// The freed memory should not be reused until the
// free is known to not have been speculative
...
if (bad_thing_happened )
11 rec_dom_abort (); // a recovery was triggered
...
}
Figure 3.1: free releasing a resource which can be used by another thread
Since many reversible domains often involve the ownership or allocation
of resources, the recovery system must ensure that a release operation (the
inverse of an acquire) does not occur until the parent domain commits. This
prevents reuse of speculative resources.
Let us assume that release actions are executed in place. Consider the
allocation in Figure 3.1. If the free is executed, it will commit since it is
an independent domain. The memory then may be allocated by a different
thread. If the request faults and triggers recovery, then the memory which
was freed will be in use and it cannot be rolled back safely. We wish to put the
memory in the state it was at the start of the request, but we cannot because
it is reused by another object. To solve this, we delay the the free until after
the domain commits to ensure that the memory isn’t reused by a different
thread.
Thus inverse actions, when they appear in code, are delayed until the com-
mit of the domain in which they appear. This is also the reason why lock
acquires are not treated as reversible though they have an obvious inverse:
deferring the inverse (the unlock) could cause deadlock if it is delayed until
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after the acquisition of a different lock.
3.4.5 Transparent Recovery Domains
Transparent domains exist based on the observation that not everything mat-
ters nor has to be exact. Many places in a system, information is kept for
statistic reporting. It is desirable that these operations be accurate, but if
in the rare event of a fault they may deviate slightly from what they would
in correct execution, no harm will result. For example, if statistics report-
ing from the network layer reports having processed 230 packets rather than
230+1 packets, the end-user is not likely to notice or care. If, however, packet
counts used as TCP sequence numbers are not accurate, the protocol fails.
This indicates that the first case is a candidate for a transparent domain, since
small inaccuracies in the information is not critical while the second case are
not a candidate for a transparent domain since accuracy is critical.
A second case transparent domains address is operations that are strictly
used for performance optimization and have no impact on the semantics of
the system. Tracking the LRU numbering of memory pages is one example:
resetting all the numbers (except for any used for pinning memory) to arbi-
trary legal values will not affect kernel correctness. Other examples include
caches and some memoization. For such domains, the state changes and their
dependences do need to be logged to ensure recovery from errors during ex-
ecution of such a domain. Upon successful completion of such a domain,
however, any dependencies formed by the execution of the domain can be
ignored, i.e., the domain can be committed immediately, since transparent
domains leave the semantics of the system intact.
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3.4.6 Unlogged Recovery Domains
The final type of domain is the unlogged domain. This domain is for ex-
tremely trusted code as well as for code which must not abort. An unlogged
domain effectively commits each write as it is issued; it transitions from spec-
ulative to completed to committed after each write. This ensures that state
changes caused by stores are never speculative. Because unlogged domains
cannot abort, reads are handled specially. An unlogged domain cannot undo
actions based on speculative values read from memory. To reflect this, reads
are not tracked for dependency formation and reads cause a logical write of
the value read back to the location. This ensures that the location is not con-
sidered speculative and will not be rolled back to a state before the unlogged
domain read it.
For example, we want the system time to increase monotonically. There-
fore, the request to update the system time after a timer interrupt is run in
an unlogged domain. This is trusted code which writes a commonly read
value. By using an unlogged domain, we ensure that time will never move
backwards due to a rollback of the time update. We further prevent readers
of the system time from forming a dependency on the interrupt handler, thus
saving some dependency tracking.
3.5 Execution Modes
Execution takes place in one of twomodes: normal mode and recovery mode.
Most execution should take place in normal mode. Recovery mode is only
entered in the event of a recovery event triggered by a fault detection mech-
anism. After the recovery system completes recovery, execution resumes in
the normal mode.
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3.5.1 Normal Execution
During execution in normal mode, all threads and requests execute without
significant deviation from their execution in the absence of the Recovery
Domains system. All memory operations are monitored and dependencies
between domains are recorded in accordance with the types of domains in-
volved. Recovery domains commit when they are able and never roll back.
In the absence of any fault, normal mode execution appears virtually iden-
tical to the code running without the recovery system. Execution deviates
some amount due to the the time and memory needed to manage recovery
domains and monitor state changes. This variation can potentially change the
interleaving of operations between threads, but only to an interleaving that
would have been allowed in the original system. Recovery domains do not
change or eliminate locks, so any change to the order locks are acquired is a
change allowed by the locking discipline.
3.5.2 Recovery Execution
Recovery is trigger by a fault detector when a fault occurs. These are explicit
calls to the recovery system to initiate recovery. These may be inserted in
the code by an instrumentation tool, inserted by the programmer, or in the
runtime of a safety checking tool. There are no implicit recovery events in
the semantics of the recovery system. All recovery must be initiated by the
programmer or by an automated tool.
Recovery events are expected to be very rare, hence the semantics of
recovery mode allow latitude in implementation. During recovery mode,
the recovery system is allowed to suspend all threads while recovery is
executing (though an implementation need not do this). Semantically re-
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Figure 3.2: Commit protocol
versible requests are undone by executing inverse actions in reverse order
per thread, but with no guarantee of orderings between inverse actions of
different threads nor any guarantees of which thread the inverse actions
will be performed. These loose orderings are allowable by the definition of
context-independent requests.
Prior to inverse actions for semantically reversible requests being exe-
cuted, the memory state is restored to appear as if the faulting request (and
any dependent requests) never executed.
3.6 Committing
A recovery domain goes through as many as three states in order: Specula-
tive, Completed, and Committed. These states and their transitions are illus-
trated in figure 3.2. All but unlogged domains begin in the Speculative state.
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When a domain exits it transitions to the Completed state. When a domain
in the Completed state has no more dependencies on uncommitted domains
it transitions to the Committed state. Each transition is accompanied by a
set of actions which will be described. Since dependencies can form chains
(A→ B→ C), completed domains must look at the transitive closure of the
dependence graph and check that they have no dependences on a Speculative
domain to transition to the committed state.
When an unlogged parent transitions from Speculative to Completed
state, it always enters the Committed state immediately; this step is explained
below.
When a basic domain transitions from Speculative to Completed state,
it merges with its parent domain such that in subsequent execution the two
domains are synonymous. It does not logically exist after this point, but
rather is part of its parent domain which remains in the Speculative state until
such time as its parent domain commits.
When an independent, reversible, or transparent domain transitions from
Speculative to Completed state, it removes all dependencies on its parents if
any exist (allowed by the context independence property, explained in section
3.4.4). This should be rare, but can arise from calling conventions for passing
structures which pass a pointer to a stack-allocated object. If a reversible
domain has a logged parent, the domain adds a dependence edge from the
parent to itself. The domain then attempts to enter the Committed state.
Attempting to enter the Committed state consists of checking that no de-
pendencies exist on speculative domains in the transitive closure of the de-
pendence graph. If no such dependencies exist, the domain transitions into
the committed state. To do so, it performs a series of actions to remove itself
from the system. First, it executes all logged delayed operations (resource
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releases). It then marks all memory locations as non-speculative for which it
is the most recent writer. It then removes all dependence edges to and from
itself in the dependence graph. At this point no more references to the com-
mitted domain exist in the system and the domain’s meta-data may be deleted.
Note that for an unlogged domain, all these operations are no-ops as it will
never have logged state changes; thus no domain will have dependencies to an
unlogged domain. After a domain commits, each domain in the Completed
state attempts to enter the Committed state (since the dependence graph has
just had edges removed, more domains may be able to commit).
Note that the commit protocol is thread-agnostic. Even though depen-
dencies may cross multiple threads, the protocol does not care about whether
an incoming or outgoing dependence edge is from or to a different thread, or
whether some delayed operations may involve updating shared state. Do-
mains may be committed on any thread, even if that thread is different from
the thread they originally executed on, and commits can happen while other
threads continue to execute normally.
3.7 Predictable Error Semantics
Recovery Domains provide the following (predictable) error semantic to
client code. To aid in explaining this semantic, as way of definition, we say
domain B is directly dependent on domain A if domain B reads a memory
location written by domain A.
• control flow in the faulting thread is returned to the start of the “fault-
ing domain,” i.e., the recovery domain within which the fault occurred;
• the memory and register state of the thread that executed the faulting
domain are restored to those that would have occurred if the faulting
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domain had not executed at all (i.e., there are no visible state changes
beyond that point), unless the domain was Unlogged, as explained in
Section 3.4.6;
• any other thread that executes a domain that is dependent on the fault-
ing domain (directly or transitively) has its control flow and state rolled
back to the start of the earliest such dependent domain, and its execu-
tion continues as if that domain itself encountered an error.
Under normal execution, there should be no visible change to the output
of the system. In the absence of output-commits, a recovery event will trigger
a rollback of just the domain affected to the entry point of the domain in the
execution stack in which the domain is executing. Any dependent domains, as
defined in 3.4, are rolled back to their entry point and restarted. All domains
which are rolled back have their undo log walked and all memory changes
undone and all inverse or compensating action executed (e.g. free if a malloc
was called). Without output-commits, this allows parallel requests which
share state with a faulting domain to be transparently isolated from the fault.
Output-commits are considered to immediately commit the domain in
which they happen. In an operating system, if a domain issues commands
to a hardware device, that domain commits, making it unrecoverable. This
is generally true for user-space applications also, but in some cases inverse
actions can be made for what would otherwise be an output-commit. Calling
malloc has an inverse action, namely free, so it can be treated as undo-able
rather than as an output-commit.
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asmlinkage long sys_open(const char *filename ,
2 int flags , int mode)
{
long ret;
/* Standard system call domain */
7 REC_SYSCALL(REC_FLAGS_NORMAL );
if (force_o_largefile ())
flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
12 ret = do_sys_open(AT_FDCWD , filename ,
flags , mode);
/* end system call domain */
/* return -RRECOVERY on fault */
17 /* return ret on normal execution */
REC_END(-RRECOVERY , ret);
return ret;
}
Figure 3.3: Annotated open system call
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3.8 ProgrammingModel
Programmer involvement in this recovery system is minimal. At a minimum,
programmers must identify requests. Figure 3.3 shows a prototypical anno-
tated system call which is annotated to return an error value in the event of a
fault. Once requests are delineated, the necessary work by the programmer
is complete. However, further work can make recovery less invasive when
triggered and lower the overhead under normal operation. Cross-thread re-
quests should be identified as requests to enable complete recovery of a single
logical request. Requests with an inverse action (e.g. kmalloc or vfs_open)
should be identified and associated with an inverse action.
Porting an existing system to the recovery system can be incremental.
Once the entry requests, those requests originating in the outside world, are
identified, recovery will work. Continued refinement will lead to faster re-
covery and faster error-free execution as well as more precise error handling.
3.9 Examples
A system call serves as an excellent example of a recovery domain. A hypo-
thetical system call is depicted as both succeeding and faulting in this section.
The specifics of what system call it is or what the sub-requests are is ignored
to focus on the behavior at the recovery domain level.
3.9.1 A Successful Request
Figure 3.4 depicts a hypothetical system call. Execution begins at the start of
the request (1). The request makes a sub-request, to a generic helper library at
(2) which starts a new protection domain (so that if the sub-request fails, the
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Figure 3.4: A hypothetical system call. 1: Start of a protection domain. 2:
Start of an independent nested protection domain. 3: End of the nested pro-
tection domain; the fact of it’s successful completion is logged in the parent
domain. 4: The nested protection domain executes a child domain. 5: A de-
ferred commit region is hit, and not executed. It is logged and deferred until
commit time. 6: Nested domain ends, and becomes dependent on its parent
for committing. 7: The protection commits. As part of this process, deferred
regions are executed. 8: All deferred regions are complete and the system call
is completely committed.
parent can clean up as specified by the programmer). Execution of the sub-
request completes and it is committed since it is a domain which is marked as
committing regardless of its context. The same happens at (4), but this sub-
request makes a further sub-request. At (5), an action, such as a resource free,
happens, which may not be visible to other threads until the request is known
to commit. Thus it is logged and postponed. This prevents unintentional
sharing of state between requests. The sub-request completes at (6). At (7) the
main request completes and, after the runtime checks for safety conditions,
commits. As part of the commit process the actions are deferred until commit
is completed.
3.9.2 A Faulting Request
Figure 3.5 is similar to figure 3.4 until a fault occurs in the sub-request. At
(5), the sub-request fails and the recovery mechanism takes over. The sub-
request is rolled back, and a semantic inverse action for the sub-sub-request is
executed to semantically roll it back. An error is returned to the main request
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Figure 3.5: A hypothetical faulting system call. 1: Start of a protection do-
main. 2: Start of an independent nested protection domain. 3: Successful
completion of the nested protection domain; this is logged in the parent do-
main. 4: A nested protection domain executes a child domain. 5: A fault
occurs. Since the independent domain was reversible, its registered inverse is
executed. 6. Rollback of memory state for the child domain is complete and
all inverse operations have been executed. Control resumes on the error path
at 4.
(as specified by the programmer of the sub-request) and the main request
deals with the error in the manner it chooses, knowing that the effects of the
sub-request are undone.
3.10 Fault Detectors
Recovery Domains do not detect faults or corrupted state in the target sys-
tem. Recovery Domains only handle the recovery and restoration of the
system once an outside entity, the fault detector, has indicated the need to
recover. Since recovery is oriented around requests and does not necessitate
rollback of the entire system, it is necessary to consider what constraints and
requirements Recovery Domains place on fault detectors in order to orches-
trate successful recovery.
The first requirement for recovering from a fault is that the fault be de-
tected in the time frame of the request in which it occurred. Once a request is
complete, it may commit, preventing recovery from a fault which occurs dur-
ing its execution. Since recoverability may not survive the end of a request,
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to recover from a fault and undo the corruption of system state caused by the
fault, the fault detector must catch the fault in the execution time-frame of
the request.
If a fault corrupts state in such a way that the fault detector will detect
uses of the corrupted state and flag a fault, then the corrupted state will not
spread to other requests, but only because the uses of the corrupt state cause
recovery. In this case the original, unflagged corruption remains. To recover
the initial corruption of state by a fault, it is important that a fault detector
detect a fault in the execution context of the request in which the fault occurs.
It is highly desirable, though not necessary, that a fault detector be “ea-
ger”. It should catch a fault before the fault can be expressed as corrupted
system state. In general this means the flag a fault before there are depen-
dent writes to memory. This prevents unintended executions in dependent
requests. For example, preventing an incorrect write to a function pointer
may prevent a different request from jumping to a incorrect location. As
long as the original request eventually faults, the dependent request using the
function pointer will be rolled back too. There is a window of vulnerabil-
ity in which either the original request or the dependent request can initial
an unrecoverable action, such as starting an unlogged domain or writing to
a hardware device. It is therefore desirable that faults be caught as soon as
possible.
3.11 Conclusion
The Recovery Domains system consists, at its heart, of runtime entities,
namely recovery domains, and the interconnection of those entities. Recov-
ery Domains are fashioned to match requests in a request-oriented system, a
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common programming pattern found in operating systems and many other
software systems. The interconnectedness of recovery domains comes from
two sources: sub-requests form a parent-child relationship and memory
dependencies form a commit-dependency relationship. These relationships
govern when domains commit and what domains rollback in the event of a
fault.
Recovery Domains provide simple semantics and a simple programming
model. Placing a low burden on the programmer is intended to minimize the
effort of porting an operating system kernel to the recovery system.
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Chapter 4
Reference Design and
Implementation
While Recovery Domains define a set of semantics and structure, they do
not dictate an implementation. Many actualizations of the system could be
imagined which maintain the semantics while differing wildly in design and
implementation. This chapter provides a reference design and implementa-
tion. It discusses our porting a real operating system to use recovery and our
experiences with the complete system.
An important component in a deployed system is the detection mecha-
nism that signals faults. The recovery system design and implementation is
independent of any detection mechanisms the programmer chooses to apply.
Fault detectors are beyond the scope of this work, though we will describe
a hypothetical combination of the memory safety detector in SVA [21] in
chapter 7.
This reference design and implementation consists of two main compo-
nents. The first is a set of compiler transforms to instrument the target system
and transform programmer annotations into recovery domains. The second
is a runtime which maintains all logs, tracks dependencies between domains,
manages committing domains, and performs roll back at a recovery event.
This chapter walks through the runtime components including the log-
ging system, the use of versioned memory, and how commits and aborts are
processed. It then turns to the porting of Linux 2.4.22 and lessons learned
from that port.
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Parent pointer previous recovery domain on the stack
Root pointer request from the outside world
Peer pointer linked list of nodes at constant tree depth
Child pointer next level in tree
Dependence set out-edges in the dependence graph
Undo log old values and version numbers of written locations
Delayed action log operations to perform on commit
Inverse log operations to perform on rollback
Table 4.1: Recovery Domain Structure members
4.1 Reference Design
This chapter describes a reference design of Recovery Domains that is based
around maintaining an undo log for rollback and versioned memory for de-
pendency discovery. Control flow is managed with setjmp and longjmp style
operations. With these design elements, we can map directly many aspects of
Recovery Domains, leading to an implementation that is understandable to
the operating system programmer. This understandability, we feel, is critical
in a reference design of something on which reliability depends. Unnecessary
complication yields more opportunities for bugs and less overall trust in the
system.
Recovery Domains are tracked at runtime by allocating an object for each
new dynamic domain. The content of this object is summarized in table 4.1.
Domains contain a parent pointer, which points to the previous recovery do-
main running on that thread. This is the domain that is restored when this
domain ends. This pointer does not care if the parent domain caused this re-
quest or if this request was from an interrupt or other outside source. The
parent is simply the domain which will be restored at completion.
The root pointer contains the closest parent domain which is indepen-
dent. Basic domains are sub-requests and depend on their parent to commit.
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Following the parents until the first independent, not basic, domain yields
the parent that is ultimately responsible for committing this domain. This
parent is stored in the root pointer to optimize dependence graph building as
well as simplifying the check to see which domains can commit.
The peer and child pointers are used to hold a tree or list, depending on the
context. The child pointer is used by a domain to point to a list of child do-
mains (sub-requests). This is a singly-linked list formed by the peer pointer.
The list is formed from the front, so if a domain is active, it is at the front of
the list. The peer pointer is also used to form a list of independent domains.
Independent domains cannot be children of another domain by definition
and therefore will not have fellow children in their linked list. The imple-
mentation does, however, need to track all independent domains, which are
the roots of commits, and does so with a linked list through the peer pointer.
The dependence set contains the out-edges of the dependence graph for
a domain. These are the domains which must commit for this domain to
commit and the domains which if any abort, cause this to domain abort. In
the implementation, this is stored as a sorted array and accessed with a binary
search since adding edges is less common than verifying their existence.
Three logs are kept by a domain. They are the undo log, the delayed
action log, and the inverse action log.
The inverse action log maintains the inverse actions for sub-requests
which are independent. This most commonly is free. The entries in the log
are records of function addresses and arguments.
The delayed action log contains records similar to the inverse action log,
but for actions which are independent and must not be executed until the
domain which would execute them has committed. This is used so that re-
sources that are semantically abstracted, such as allocations, are not reused
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Lock protects meta-data
Current Version version number of location
Committed Version version of last commit
Last Writer last recovery domain to make a specu-
lative write to the location
Table 4.2: Versioned memory meta-data
before they are known to be be available.
The undo log contains the state which must be reverted during a commit.
Entries are records consisting of a locations, a size, contents, and the previous
owner. The first three fields of the record contain the necessary information
to restore a location to its pre-domain state. The previous owner field allows
the rollback to restore the meta-data for the locations.
4.2 Versioned Memory
The reference design uses a form of versioned memory to keep track of the
chain of writers to a location and the last commit of a location. Versioned
memory is not used to undo writes, but only to manage dependencies.
Each memory location, logically, has meta-data containing a lock, the last
writer, the current version, and the last committed version. These are sum-
marized in table 4.2.
Although the lock protects each meta-data structure from concurrent ac-
cess and update, it does much more. Access to the meta-data for a location
is serialized by the lock, as is access to the location itself. A meta-data lock
serves as a lock on the location which the meta-data covers. Since logging,
discussed later, requires an atomic read and a write of a location, this lock
doubles for that. The lock also blocks interrupts to prevent deadlock. An
interrupt-started domain could try to update meta-data that was already be-
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ing updated, and hence locked, by the domain it interrupted, thus leading to
deadlock. Logging does not use a atomic-swap for the access to the loca-
tion simply because all access is already covered by the meta-data lock and an
atomic exchange operation (like all atomic operations) is expensive.
The current version field is maintained as a reference for the greatest value
of the version number stored by any recovery domain. When a domain writes
to the location, this value is incremented and logged by the writer. This pro-
vides an absolute ordering of writes to the location.
The committed version field indicates the latest version of the location
which was committed. Since a location can be written by two threads without
intervening reads, the two writes may be by independent domains. If the
second writer commits and then the first domain reverts, we need to know
that the second write must be preserved. Tracking the last committed version
allows the system to discard writes of older versions during revert.
The last writer field stores the domain which wrote the current version of
the location. If that domain has already committed, this is null. This is used
by readers to form dependencies.
4.2.1 Global Versioning Structures
Storing a meta-data entry for every memory location would be prohibitively
expensive. If an entry was maintained for every pointer-sized location the
kernel could access there would be a 4:1 memory overhead. On 32 bit Linux,
this would amount to using 800MB of the kernel’s 1GB of reserved address
space. Since this overhead is too high and much of the address space is
sparsely accessed, we hashmemory locations. The hash function simply takes
the lowest order bits, minus the bottom two, to map pointer-sized locations
to the hash-table.
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Using a hash table can result in false dependencies between domains.
However, using a dynamic structure, such as some form of a binary tree,
causes significant slowdown. The structure is accessed once for every load
and store issued in the kernel. Anything more complex than a direct index
of the hashed location dominates the runtime. Thus the performance over-
head of a more exact sparse structure is not worth the increase in precision of
dependence tracking.
4.2.2 Load and Store Replacement
The recovery compiler must instrument the original program instructions to
monitor the load and store traffic. This is done as a wholesale replacement of
load, store, and atomic memory instructions. These instructions are replaced
with calls into the recovery runtime which updates the necessary meta-data
and performs the operations. Loads and stores are discussed below, atomic
operations are not discussed but are very similar.
Figure 4.1 depicts the operations performed by the runtime for each store
instruction. A store instruction is replaced by a call into the runtime which
passes the location (pointer), the value to write, and the current recovery
domain. The location is hashed to acquire the meta-data. The meta-data is
locked and the previous writer is compared to the current writer. If they dif-
fer, the version for the location is incremented. The new version, the old value
of the location, and the pointer are logged in the current recovery domain’s
log. The store is execute and the lock is released. If the current writer is the
same as the previous writer for the location, only the store, logging, and lock
release happen; no version number needs to be changed.
Figure 4.2 depicts the operations performed by the runtime for each load
instruction. A load instruction is replaced by a call into the runtime which
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Figure 4.1: Store to a pointer
Figure 4.2: Load of a Pointer
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passes the location (pointer) and the current recovery domain. The return
value is the result of the load. The location is hashed to acquire the meta-
data. The meta-data is locked and the previous writer is compared to the
current reader. If they differ, an edge is added in the dependence graph from
the reader to the writer. The load is execute and the lock is released. If the
current reader is the same as the previous writer for the location, only the
load and lock release happen.
4.3 Tracking Dependencies Between Recovery
Domains
Every recovery domain tracks which domains it depends on and what do-
mains depend on it, creating a dependence graph between domains. This
dependence information is important because when a domain experiences
an error, it allows the rolling back of only those domains which have been
“tainted” by the error. This mechanism correctly handles dependencies that
cross threads, which is important due to the inherently threaded nature of the
systems we are interested in.
This tracking is represented as a graph. Each recovery domain contains a
sorted array of pointers to domains it is dependent upon. This allows a binary
search to test whether a dependency exists either for purposes of committing
or for purposes of adding a dependency after a read. Only out-edges are
stored in the graph.
On a read, meta-data maintained by the run-time is consulted to deter-
mine if the location contains a committed value, as explained in section 4.2.2.
If so, no dependency information is updated. If it contains a speculative value,
a (directed) dependency edge is formed to the domain responsible for the last
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write of that location.
On a write, the meta-data for the location is updated to reflect the new
writer. If the writer is an unlogged domain, then the write is committed, else
the write is marked as speculative and the recorded writer helps subsequent
readers form dependence edges.
Tracking dependencies between recovery domains is mainly useful be-
tween separate threads; nested domains identify dependencies between do-
mains within the same thread. Domains are nested at run-time, and the nest-
ing structure forms one or more trees that determine when and how domains
can commit. To track nesting, the run-time maintains a stack of active do-
mains. All code runs in some domain, even if that domain is the default un-
logged domain. This ensures that all code participates in the maintenance of
meta-data.
When a recovery domain starts, it inspects the current stack to find the
currently active recovery domain. It records the domain as its parent so that,
on exit, it may restore that domain to an active state. A basic domain will
become a child of that domain and become dependent on it for commit. That
is, when the basic domain exits, it will not commit but simply notifies its par-
ent domain, which when it commits will commit the child. All other domain
types, however, do not record their parent: instead they starts a new tree.
They remember the previous active domain only for the purpose of restoring
it on exit.
4.3.1 Graph Simplification and Search
When finding domains to commit, the entire dependence graph must be
search to see if a domain can reach an active domain through the depen-
dence edges. If it can, the domain may not be committed. This search is
50
implemented as a depth first search starting from the domain in question and
stopping anytime an active domain is reached. All reachable domains may
either be committed or have their dependence edges rewritten. If the domain
the search started at can commit, then any domain visited in the DFS can
commit. If not, then the set of active domains which prevent commit are a
common set of dependencies for all visited domains. The edges can then be
replaced by this set, simplifying further traversals.
Alternative Simplification
Initially, a transitive closure was computed by merging the out-edges of each
domain with the out-edges of all domains it was dependent on. This is more
expensive in both space and time than the DFS-based graph simplification.
4.3.2 Alternative Graph Representations
The primary alternative graph representation we tried was a dense matrix
of bits. Each set bit represented an edge from the row domain to the col-
umn domain. This representation makes computing the transitive closure
relatively easy. It also makes testing for the existence of an edge a constant
time operation, rather than a log(n) operation. The primary failing of this
representation is its fixed size. The tracking structures need to be allocated
statically to avoid requiring a call to the OS to acquire new memory if more
domains than the matrix has room for are added. The number of domains in
the system was seen to be very bursty. Thus much of the time the fixed size
required examining more of the matrix than was necessary to compute the
transitive closure. Then during a large burst of activity, the matrix would not
have enough capacity for the number of domains in the system. The size of
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Figure 4.3: Paged log structure
the matrix is practically limited by the exponential growth in memory usage
as the number of possible active domains increases.
4.4 Logging
Recovery Domains has several modes of logging. At the lowest level, mem-
ory writes are logged. This is the basis of rollback for a recovery domain. To
increase flexibility and reduce inter-domain dependencies, operations may
also be logged at the semantic level. Finally operations may be logged to be
executed at the committing of a domain.
All logs use a list of pages as illustrated in figure 4.3. Log entries are
stored in an array on a single, page-sized allocation. These pages are stored
as a linked list. When a page is full, a new page is pushed on the linked
list and entries are written to it until it is full. This provides very efficient
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storage in space and time. The overhead per entry is two words amortized
over the number of entries in a page. The frequency of the allocations is once
per number of entries in a page. Further, single hardware-sized pages are
used so that if all internal memory is exhausted and the recovery system must
acquire memory from the operating system, the allocations will not require
contiguous virtual or physical pages.
Semantic logging occurs when an operation is declared as a domain with
a semantic inverse. In such cases, upon the successful completion of the op-
eration, the success is logged with sufficient information to perform the se-
mantic inverse operation. This structure allows two things. First it allows
optimized handling of independent subsystems for which a clear higher-level
logical structure is known, such as malloc (the inverse being free). Sec-
ond it allows inverses for code which modifies the state of devices. Writes to
memory-mapped devices or other device control channels cause state changes
that are not reversible by writing the old values to the device since writes
cause complex state changes. Semantic inverses allow operations to be given
inverses which encode the knowledge of the controlled device. In the case
where there are no dependencies on other executing domains, domains with
semantic inverse need not have their log retained by the calling context since
the reversal of that domain is logged semantically. During the execution of a
domain with a semantic inverse, memory logging occurs so that in the case
of a recovery event within the domain, the domain can be reversed. How-
ever, once the domain completes, the parent need only record the successful
completion and the necessary information to call the inverse after a recovery
event.
To allow resource managing subsystems such as malloc and free to not
often interfere with each other, operations may be logged to be deferred until
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the successful completion of the calling request. This prevents, for example,
memory from being allocated and freed by one domain, then allocated by an-
other domain. In such a case unnecessary dependencies are formed by due to
the artifact of memory being reused by the allocator after a free. These depen-
dencies should not exist. By deferring operations, many false dependencies
can be avoided.
4.4.1 Alternative Log Structures
We tried several alternative structures for storing the log. Chief among these
were a pure linked list and an array. A linked list, even with a very efficient
allocator was less efficient than the hybrid structure we used. Much of that
inefficiency comes not from the allocator, but from the overhead in storing
the pointer to the next element. This pointer increased the size of each log
entry and the store added expense to a very performance-critical portion of
code (the store path). Since there is no constraint on the number of memory
operations a recovery domain may execute, there was no fixed size array that
would suffice.
4.5 Committing Recovery Domains
A commit of a domain comes when a domain meets the conditions specified
in chapter 3.6, namely it and all domains it is dependent on are in the done
state. The order in which domains are committed in the commit protocol
does not matter.
When a domain is committed, as illustrated in figure 4.4, several parts
of the domain structure, per-thread data, and global structures are updated.
The commit updates the current recovery domain for the thread with the
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Figure 4.4: Committing a domain
one previously running prior to the start of this domain. If a domain was in
the done state but not active, which is the case if it could not commit due
to a dependency, this is omitted. For the entire commit procedure on all
domains involved, a global lock, which protects recovery domain creation
and destruction, is held.
The commit procedure walks the undo log, committing each write. This
is done by taking the written location and hashing the pointer to acquire the
meta-data for that location. The lock for the location is acquired and the
version in the undo log is compared to the last committed version in the log.
The meta-data is written with the maximum of the two version numbers. If
the last writer was the committing domain, the last writer field is cleared. The
lock is then released.
Committing a location can be done in arbitrary version order. Depen-
dency edges ensure that true data-dependencies are maintained between read-
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ers and writers. Committing a version does not change the current version of
a location. This is because a later, uncommitted writer may still exist which
will have incremented the version number. However, since the write we are
committing overwrote existing data and all subsequent readers will depend
on the new version or a later version, any reader of old versions already has
the necessary dependencies on the writers. An older version may be rolled
back, but this will be a no-op since the effect of the rolled back domain is
already masked by a later writer.
After memory is committed, the deferred action log is walked, executing
each deferred action. These actions are those operations which, due to being
independent, must be delayed until it is known they should execute. The
most common example is a resource release or deallocation.
4.6 Rolling Back Recovery Domains
A rollback is triggered when some run-time mechanism, either a part of the
system or code inserted by an external tool, detects a potentially fatal error.
During normal execution, the system must maintain an undo log for each
speculatively written location, and a domain dependency graph for each do-
main. In addition, each domain maintains a list of deferred actions, such as
resource frees. The recovery system rolls back a faulty domain (or an enclos-
ing parent domain) and any other domains that are dependent on it. To roll
back a domain, the recovery system restores any memory perturbations and
undoes resources allocated for all dependent domains from the logs for those
domains. This is illustrated in figure 4.5.
During rollback, all affected threads are halted at a known state, and one
process walks the dependence graph of the faulting domain, rolling back any
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Figure 4.5: Rolling back a domain
dependent domain. Because versioning is kept for writes as part of the meta-
data, domains can be rolled back in any order and the rollback code ensures
that the original value prior to all the rolled back speculative writes is re-
stored. Reversible operations encountered in the log are reversed with their
inverse function; by definition of such operations, the order in which these
inverses are applied is irrelevant. Register state is restored to the point of
domain entry for each active rolled-back domain, with the only change ap-
pearing as though the domain entry instruction returned an error (this is es-
sentially setjmp and longjmp, but potentially operating on threads besides
the current one).
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4.6.1 Error Virtualization
One key design goal is to use existing error return paths to preserve failure se-
mantics, expedite recovery, and simplify the implementation. Complex server
systems like an OS have extensive error checking, with corresponding error
return paths, for anticipated errors. In particular, many internal functions in
such a system are programmed to handle error conditions when they occur,
either by retrying an operation, or returning appropriate error information to
their callers, which then continue the process. This process creates the error
return path, which often propagates all the way back to the external client.
The system specifies a semantic for error handling that clients (e.g., system
calls) must use to deal with errors cleanly. By leveraging these existing error
return paths, we can incorporate comprehensive error recovery from nearly
all of a given system, such as an operating system, while requiring relatively
few changes to the code base.
Each domain specifies an integer error return code, which is returned to
its parent domain when an internal error is detected. The parent domain
can then handle this error code as desired by the programmer. If most do-
mains start at existing error checking points, then little further effort should
be needed to perform recovery and error return from unexpected errors.
Within a kernel, asynchronous requests are similar to a system call. A do-
main places a request on some structure. At some point another thread ser-
vices that request. These execution paths have defined ways for the worker to
return errors to the requester. Thus this idiom is implemented as an indepen-
dent domain for the worker which, if it fails, returns an error code though
the same channel by which it would normally return an error code to the
requester.
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In the case of a kernel, when an error propagates up to the application,
appearing as a failed system call, the kernel can choose to return a suitable er-
ror code for that system call. For applications that don’t care about the error
code, including those that don’t wish to recover, this choice is unimportant.
For other applications, if this is a pre-existing error code, no changes are
needed to applications that use that system call. If it is a newly defined error
code, applications that wish to recover would need to handle this code ap-
propriately. If the error is persistent, i.e., retrying the same system call causes
the error to repeat, then the application may have to compensate in some
application-specific way or may simply be forced to die. In any of these
cases, the kernel and other applications should not be affected.
4.7 Compiler Passes
The recovery compiler consists of a series of passes to transform the anno-
tated kernel source into recovery-instrumented machine code. The first pass
replaces all memory operations with calls to runtime routines that will per-
form the operation, log the operation, and track dependencies caused by it.
The second pass interprets programmer-supplied annotations and maps these
annotations to sequences of low level annotations.
The compiler components are implemented in the LLVM compiler frame-
work [47]. Kernels are compiled through the normal C front-end and ma-
chine code is generated by the normal back-end; all transformations happen
on optimized intermediate representation (IR) code. Source annotations exist
in the original source code and are passed through the front-end unchanged.
The first pass replaces all memory operations with calls to runtime rou-
tines that will perform the operation, log the operation, and track dependen-
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cies caused by it. This was explained previously in section 4.2.2.
The second pass interprets programmer-supplied annotations and maps
these to sequences of lower-level annotations, namely domain_begin and
domain_end, to be dealt with by the third pass. This pass allows the pro-
grammer to succinctly annotate the kernel (in this implementation, as a file
specifying the functions to be treated as domains, their inverses if any, and
their type). The programmer can directly use the low level annotations if
necessary or convenient.
void* kmalloc(size_t size , int type) {
//begin a logged, reversible domain
char* buf = rec_domain_begin (log=1, reversible=1);
4 //record current register state
int iserror = rec_setjmp(buf);
if (!iserror) {
// kmalloc_orig is the original kmalloc, renamed
result = kmalloc_orig(size , type);
9 // end the kmalloc domain
rec_domain_end ();
// log inverse function
rec_log_undo(kfree , result);
} else {
14 // Error landing pad:
// The user specified null as the error return
// value for the kmalloc domain. At this point, no
// kernel state has been restored by the runtime
// as though domain_kmalloc had never been called.
19 result = NULL;
}
return result;
}
Figure 4.6: Example of the recovery domain transformation on kmalloc. The
new functions implemented in the runtime are underlined. kmalloc_orig
contains the original code for kmalloc.
The third pass transforms low level annotations into operations to setup
and tear down recovery domains, and uses setjmp to create a landing pad
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for control flow after a domain aborts. Figure 4.7 shows the result of the
third pass on the kmalloc function. kmalloc becomes a wrapper that hides
the domain management from the callers. It sets up a domain with a call to
rec_domain_begin which returns a buffer used for setjmp. Normally, the
original code for kmalloc is executed. The domain is then committed since
kmalloc is reversible; the inverse is logged in case the parent aborts; and the
result value is returned to the caller. If, however, the kmalloc domain aborts,
the error return code specified by the annotations, namelyNULL, is returned
to the caller. The runtime manages rolling back state and terminating the
faulting domain before passing control to the landing pad.
4.8 Runtime
The runtime consists of 4 major components: recovery domain management,
logging, memory data-flow detection, and rollback infrastructure. The run-
time is SMP-safe and totals 1867 lines of C++ code (including all assertions
and debugging code) and 30 lines of assembly. Compiled, it results in 36kB of
program text, though for performance, it is linked to the kernel using LLVM
to perform inter-procedural optimization.
Recovery domain management implements the domain stack as a linked
list with the active domain (top of stack) at the front. It also tracks the type
of domain and dictates whether operations should be logged or not, as well
as managing the rollback or commit of domains.
Logging is implemented as a linked list of 4kB pages, each of which can
hold about 150 logging records. When a page fills up, a new one is linked
in. When a child domain terminates, its log is either linked in directly or, if it
was a reversible domain and committed, its inverse is recorded. If a domain
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reverse is marked for delayed execution (such as a resource free), the delayed
function and its arguments are recorded.
Recovery domain management implements several data structures includ-
ing the domain stack, the logs of writes and inverse actions, and the domain
dependency graph. The domain dependency graph is stored as an out-edge
set in each domain. The completed but uncommitted domains are kept in a
list. The dependency graph is divided into two regions, the active domains
and the completed domains. Two properties are exploited to reduce the size
of the out-edge sets while still maintaining the necessary transitive closure of
the graph. First, only edges in the active set will form new dependence edges.
Thus all new edges will point from the active set to the completed set. Second,
only edges from the committed set to the active set matter for computing if
a domain in the completed set can commit. Because of this, the out-edge sets
for completed domains only include edges to active domains. When an active
domain is moved to the completed set, all nodes with edges to it are updated
to include its edges to active domains (thus maintaining the necessary tran-
sitive closure) and its out-edges are pruned to only contain edges to active
domains. This optimization greatly reduces the number of edges that must
be kept.
Dependencies due to memory reads and writes are tracked by memory
versioning. Memory addresses are hashed after masking off the lower bits so
regions are at least 64 bits (though in practice are several times larger). No
collision avoidance is done, so regions with the same hash value artificially
alias. For each entry, a sequence number of the last write, a sequence number
of the last commit, a count of domains with references to the location, and a
reference to the last writer is maintained. On a write, the sequence number
is incremented and the writer records the old value of the memory and the
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sequence number of its write. Since a reference to that location is entered in
a log, the count for the location is incremented. The writer is also recorded
as the most recent writer of that region. On a read, the reader checks to
determine if there is an uncommitted writer and, if so, adds an edge in the
dependence graph to the writer.
The rollback mechanism simply walks the log in reverse order undoing
operations and removing the current domain from the stack of domains.
longjmp is used to return control to the landing pad created by the compiler.
During rollback, other threads that are dependent on the current domain are
also rolled back, directly modifying the saved state of the inactive thread (this
requires Linux-specific knowledge; an OS-agnostic version would set a flag
in the rolled back domain so on next execution, control would transfer to the
recovery point).
The commit mechanism walks the log, updating memory regions to re-
flect the sequence number of the logged writes, if that update is greater than
the sequence number of the last commit. Further, if any deferred actions are
logged for the domain (and its children), they are executed (e.g. memory
frees, reference count decrements).
4.9 Porting Linux
Two very different Linux kernels were ported to the recovery system. The
first, which will be described here, is the SVA ported Linux 2.4.22 kernel as
used in the SVAwork [21]. The recovery system itself is completely indepen-
dent of SVA – SVA is only used as an error detection mechanism. To demon-
strate that and to gather experience porting another kernel, Linux 2.6.27 was
also ported. Linux 2.6.27 has some fairly major structural differences. In the
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first porting exercise, several interesting common cases were discovered that
influenced the design of the recovery system. These include spin-locks, re-
quest queues, reference counting, and performance counters. As discussed
below, extra porting effort went into these objects as it greatly reduced the
number of dependencies between domains.
The starting point for a port to the recovery system is to identify en-
try points and allocators. For Linux, system call and interrupt entry points
were annotated as independent recovery domains. The list of basic alloca-
tors (e.g. kmalloc, kmem_cache_alloc, __alloc_pages) were annotated as
semantically reversible domains, and their inverses specified.
With this basic port, it became clear that spin-locks were a major cause
of thread interference. Because atomic operations were modeled as reads and
writes (with the writes logged only if the atomic operation succeeded), any
two threads that accessed the same spin-lock (even if they did not contend
for it) would form a read-after-write dependency. A basic spin-lock is binary,
and is used for synchronization. What data-flow exists is really control flow
masquerading as data flow. With these observations, successful spin-lock ac-
quires and releases are modeled as write-only memory accesses with old val-
ues of ’0’ and ’1’ respectively. Trying to acquire a spin lock was not treated
as a read operation. This preserves the property that a lock is released on a
rollback while breaking unnecessary dependencies. Reader-Writer spin-locks
were treated in a similar fashion.
Many counters used for performance statistics, e.g., the number of blocks
written to a disk, are not used in any decisionmade by the kernel; they simply
exist to be reported to user-space. These are not critical to the consistency of
the kernel after (presumably rare) error recovery. Therefore counter incre-
ment and decrement functions were defined as unlogged, reversible domains.
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On a rollback, the counter increment or decrement is undone, but other do-
mains are not rolled back.
The kernel code implementing the exit system call has an internal func-
tion that does not return because the thread is terminated. Making this func-
tion (do_exit) an unlogged domain, however, is not attractive because it
performs considerable work, including closing files, tearing down address
spaces, and notifying other threads. Any of these operations could fail, in
which case we would like to restore kernel state and return an error. To fix
this mismatch, the kernel function do_exitwas changed to return an int and
made an independent domain. Code which called do_exit (not expecting it
to return) was modified to go into an infinite loop calling do_exit. On a
permanent fault, this could cause the thread essentially to leak and try to exit
whenever it is scheduled, but this seems a better engineering tradeoff than al-
lowing exit to perform large and complex state changes to global kernel data
structures in an unrecoverable domain.
Correctly handling thread exit also required the introduction of the basic
primitive rec_thread_exit. This primitive causes all domains on the stack
to transition to the completed state. It is the last thing called before the kernel
calls schedule from the thread, never to return to that thread again. Delayed
commits and other resource frees for the defunct thread happen on the next
attempt by any thread to commit.
Many objects in the kernel are reference counted. Handling these well
reduces the number of unneeded dependencies. A reference counted object
is acquired by calling a function on an existing object. This function acts
very much like an allocator, in that it has an inverse, but serves to update the
reference count of the object. A similar function exists for when an object
is no longer needed. This function often handles the finalizing and freeing
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Change LOC
recovery hooks 9
counter conversions 28
moving functions out of headers 40
spin lock conversion 34
exit fixes 6
bootup fixes 3
fork 1
misc 11
Total 132
Table 4.3: Changes to Linux 2.4.22 by type and lines of code
the associated object when the reference count reaches zero. All the major
structures in the VFS layer used this idiom. Thus the reference acquiring and
releasing functions were declared as inverses of each other and acquisition
functions as semantically invertible domains. Because of this, dependencies
between threads that existed only because of a change to the reference count
of an object were broken, without disturbing the garbage collection proper-
ties of the code. As a proof of concept, only the file-system was thoroughly
ported in this way.
While many interesting cases were considered and ported (and several
more primitives, such as queues, would benefit from special care), no design
changes were needed in porting the Linux kernel to use Recovery Domains.
Furthermore, only 132 lines of code were added or modified for the port of
Linux 2.4.22 as broken down by type in Table 4.9.
The port of Linux 2.6.27 proceeded similarly, starting with the alloca-
tors, system calls, and interrupt handlers. The softirq handlers and the sched-
uler were also annotated. The hooks for runtime memory allocation were
added. No major design changes were needed, even though several major
kernel features, such as kernel preemption, were added in this kernel version.
Furthermore, even fewer lines of code needed to be changed because (for ex-
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ample) many macros had been moved out of headers and converted to inline
functions. This port is operational, but never tuned to provide competitive
performance. A new port of a non-SVA based Linux 2.6.27 is discussed in
Chapter 5.
4.10 Discussion
Several limitations and special considerations regarding recovery domains are
discussed here. Sources of deadlock introduced by Recovery Domains are
discussed first. Ways to corrupt the runtime and prevent recovery are then
discussed followed by a brief note on the output commit problem.
4.10.1 Avoiding Deadlock
The interaction between the process and thread management in the OS and
the Recovery Domains commit protocol can be a subtle source of deadlock.
Initially, to prevent corrupt state from leaking to user-space and to ensure
that a request is never reported as successful if it still might be rolled back
due to a dependency, system calls did not return until they committed.
Some system calls, however, block for reasons which necessarily cause
interference (and hence dependencies) with other system calls. While an IO
operation can block, it will eventually unblock due to the structure of the
kernel. A system-call such as sys_wait will necessarily, at least in the Linux
implementation, read and write memory from the control block of the very
threads on which it is waiting. The state written happens to be read as amatter
of course in several other system calls the waited-upon thread can issue. This
causes a circular dependency: a kernel level dependency from the waiting
thread to the thread being waited on and a recovery domain level dependency
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from the waited upon thread trying to commit and return to user-space and
the thread which will not commit until the wait condition is satisfied. The
recovery system does not know about this cycle.
To avoid this, it is helpful to note that only one system call can get into
this situation. We therefore treated it specially: having it transition out of a
normal domain into an unlogged domain prior to blocking. This effectively
causes it to commit early and not block any other request.
We further only make a good faith effort to commit a system call prior to
returning to user-space. If yielding the processor to other requests does not,
after a finite time, allow the system call to commit, it returns to user-space
uncommitted and it will commit once its dependencies are met.
4.10.2 Corrupting the Recovery System
The recovery domain does not inherently protect itself from corruption by
the kernel. This corruption can come from several sources. It is worth noting
that many basic memory fault detectors will catch and prevent corruption.
Faults can come from stray pointers, stray control flow, stray DMA opera-
tions, and incorrect page re-mapping.
Of these, stray pointers are the most likely. Many bugs are caused by
incorrect pointer arithmetic or buffer overflows. Such an error could cause
writes to memory used by the recovery system, thus corrupting it. Range
checks could be employed in the runtime, since all writes are routed through
the runtime, to prevent this, but it was felt that memory faults would be the
first and most common fault detector deployed. Catching memory faults is
left to the detector, but corruption to the runtime could be caught by the
runtime.
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Stray control flow is mostly solvable by preventing corruption to mem-
ory. However, since thread state is stored by the kernel, control flow can
be corrupted by inbound writes to the structure storing the register state for
inactive threads. Corrupted control flow can execute instructions which are
not instrumented and not prevented from writing to the recovery runtime.
There is no obvious way prevent this potential for corruption of control state
and only limited ways to prevent corruption to the runtime.
The only way to partially prevent corruption is to keep the runtime from
being writable by the kernel. This can be done through the page tables. Ran-
dom code executing in the kernel can undo any page table protection allowing
corruption. Incorrect page mappings cannot be solved for this very reason.
The last source, DMA, can be partially prevented by using an input-
output memory management unit (IOMMU). IOMMUs allow restricting
access to system memory to devices. While correct programming of an
IOMMU can prevent hardware devices from corrupting the recovery run-
time, correct programming can be prevented by one of the other sources of
corruption or by programmer error.
4.10.3 Output Commit Mitigation
Like any system with rollback, output commit is a problem. Values can es-
cape to the outside world though hardware before rollback happens. These
values cannot be rolled back; the values may cause hardware to execute non-
reversible operation, such as sending a network packet.
The structure of many drivers in the kernel help mitigate, but do not al-
leviate, the output commit problem. Many subsystems perform most work
in a context which does not interact with hardware. The passing of data to
the hardware device is separate from the processing of requests which take
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the data from applications. Such a structure allows the system to success-
fully commit most of the complex processing of requests without touching
hardware. The controlling of hardware devices is done after the application
request commits.
Although this structure found in many drivers allows most complex logic
to be recoverable, it is serendipitous, but not required. The recovery system
currently cannot prevent output commit.
4.11 Conclusion
The reference implementation of Recovery Domains provides effective re-
covery from faults while being understandable by operating system program-
mers. Performance is good for several benchmarks, though low for an IO
intensive benchmark. The system provides an impressive recovery rate from
random faults inspiring confidence that recovery domains are good approach
to recovery from operating system faults.
The design achieves a simplicity which lends credibility to the implemen-
tation. Versioned memory and undo logging form the basis of the design.
Domains are allowed to finish without committing and a commit protocol
ensures domains commit when they can.
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Chapter 5
Design and Implementation of
Compiler and Runtime Analysis
and Optimizations
The reference implementation of Recovery Domains given in the previous
chapter does not use analysis of the operating system by the compiler to
optimize the recovery system. In fact, it depends on the compiler only for
instrumentation of memory operations and inserting domain setup and tear-
down. We observe that the runtime recovery burden can be reduced through
static compiler analysis, dynamic, run-time analysis, and additional knowl-
edge about the kernel’s use of locks. This analysis allows the system to selec-
tively not monitor some memory operations while reducing the logging and
versioning requirements of some other operations.
The new optimizations are based around:
Dependence Graph: At runtime, the dependence graph is analyzed to see
if it, or specific domains, are complete (have all possible out-edges
formed). In this case, no monitoring of loads is needed.
Locked Accesses: At compile time, all loads and stores are analyzed to see if
they are accessing an object which is protected by a lock. Locks and
the objects they protect are identified by a new annotation. Locked
accesses do not need locking or versioning on writes and no monitoring
of loads.
Fresh Access: At compile time, all loads and stores are analyzed to see if they
are accessing an object which has been allocated but is not yet visible to
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other requests. Fresh accesses need no monitoring of reads or writes.
This chapter describes these optimizations as well as the runtime changes
necessary to support them. A new port of Linux 2.6.27 to Recovery Domains
is used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the optimizations.
5.1 Dynamic Analysis of Dependence Graph
Every read is normally monitored to see if it forms a read-after-write depen-
dence with an uncommitted domain. The dependence graph is not between
individual locations, rather it is between domains. It is therefore unnecessary
to monitor a read if the dependence graph cannot have an edge added to it by
the read. We take advantage of this property both globally and locally.
To simplify dynamic analysis and to improve overhead in general, we
store two dependency graphs. The first graph is the full dependency graph
between all domains. The second graph is that graph projected onto just the
domains that form the roots of requests. These roots are exactly the inde-
pendent domains. Each independent request may have many generations of
descendants in the form of normal domains.
Computing whether a domain may commit requires the transitive closure
of the subset of the dependency graph reachable from the domain which is
trying to commit. Computing a transitive closure is expensive and storing
all edges for the closed graph costs memory and time. The time may be paid
more than once as the dependence graph will be traversed again if a domain is
not able to immediately commit. To minimize edges, we treat the sub-graph
of all independent domains specially. When a domain forms a dependency,
this edge is mirrored in the independent domain subgraph. That is, A → B
forms A.root → B.root. Since all child domains have an implicit dependency
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on their parent, it is not necessary form dependencies on finished child do-
mains which are waiting on their parent. We can directly form a dependence
on the active parent. This prevents many edges from being formed to inactive
domains.
Dynamically, the runtime considers the completeness of the dependence
graph. If the sub-graph of the dependence graph of independent (root) do-
mains is complete, then no operation can add a dependence edge. The run-
time detects this condition by comparing edge counts to the number of inde-
pendent domains. When this comparison shows that all possible edges have
been formed, a global flag is set. The compiler-generated load instrumenta-
tion checks this flag and if it is set, performs the load in place rather than
calling into the runtime. The flag is cleared when a new domain is created, as
there is now a new target for dependencies. This provides substantial savings
by changing all reads (which account for roughly 66% of the memory oper-
ations) in the common case from a call to the runtime to a check of a global
flag. Examples of instrumented code are in section 5.4.
While a global flag is simple, some work can be avoided by reasoning
about an individual domain’s dependencies. When a single domain has all
possible dependencies, it does not need to read version information to add
dependence edges even if other domains still do.
We take advantage of the mirroring of edges into the independent-domain
subgraph by ignoring child domains when checking if a domain can commit.
Since all dependencies are projected onto the independent-domain subgraph,
computing the transitive closure and checking that all dependencies can com-
mit is performed on the subgraph rather than on the entire graph.
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asmlinkage long sys_munmap(unsigned long addr,
size_t len)
3 {
int ret;
struct mm_struct *mm = current ->mm;
/* Annotation marking this function as the start
8 * of a recovery domain
*/
REC_SYSCALL();
profile_munmap(addr);
13
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem , mm);
/* down_write calls:
* rec_acquire(&mm->mmap_sem, mm,
* sizeof(mm_struct));
18 */
ret = do_munmap(mm, addr, len);
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem , mm);
/* up_write calls:
* rec_release(&mm->mmap_sem, mm,
23 * sizeof(mm_struct));
*/
return ret;
}
Figure 5.1: Example simple lock annotation
5.2 Locked Memory
We add one new annotation to mark memory covered by a read-writer or
exclusive lock. This annotation specifies four things: the lock location, the
lock acquisition point, the lock release point, and the region of memory cov-
ered by the lock. An example use of the annotation is shown in Figure 5.1
in which the mm_struct for the current process is locked for exclusive write.
The lock is annotated with information about which portion of memory it
covers, in this case all of the mm_struct. The end of the locked region is an-
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notated. The annotations make no assumptions about the use of the memory
after the release of the lock.
Not shown in the example is that an annotation can mark the objects
pointed to by fields as also being covered under the lock, including linked
structures. This allows objects with linked lists of trees, for example, which
are protected by the lock, to be considered locked with the object. This is
a fairly common occurrence and turns out to be very important in practice.
For example, one of the most exercised functions in the benchmark post-
mark, find_vma, traverses a red-black tree which is referenced by a field in a
structure and covered by a lock in that structure.
The lock annotation is optional and need not be applied to every type of
object. The recovery system operates correctly without any lock annotation,
but the annotation provides opportunity for the compiler to reduce overhead.
5.2.1 Optimizations for Locked Memory
Locked objects, which are very common in a kernel, have several useful prop-
erties with respect to logging and versioning. First and most obviously, if an
object is exclusively locked for writing, then the meta-data handling the ver-
sioning of the memory locations in that object do not have to be locked for
updating. Objects locked for shared-reading, likewise, do not require version
meta-data locking when performing a read as the meta-data is not changing.
Dependence graphs still must be updated, but this is done in a request-local
manner.
More interestingly, a lock provides a single memory location that can be
used as a proxy for dependency tracking for the objects under lock. If all
accesses to lock-protected regions of an object are performed after the lock
is acquired, then any dependence edge between requests which could form
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will have already formed by virtue of acquiring the lock. A write lock will
update the lock location, marking itself as the last writer. Since a writer must
first read the lock to acquire it, it will form a read-after-write dependency on
the previous writer. Any subsequent reader will first check the lock and ac-
quire it for reading. This operation is a read-after-write dependence and will
form an edge in the dependence graph. Writers form a dependency chain due
to the serializing nature of the lock and readers will transitively depend on
all uncommitted writers simply by depending on the last writer in the chain.
Therefore all reads of a locked object can be unmonitored. Since writes are
already serialized, writes to the object need only perform logging, not ver-
sioning. The lock provides a proxy version for the entire object or memory
region.
Locked Memory Analysis
The analysis to find locked accesses is shown in Figure 5.2. The locked prop-
erty is acquired for objects at the annotation and dropped at the release an-
notation. Operations on the object are locked if they meet three conditions:
there are no paths to them which do not go though a lock annotation, after
the lock annotation there are no unlocks, and there are no joins with un-
locked objects. Initially, calls are considered unlocking operations. Calls are
analyzed to see if they preserve the locking of their arguments. Calls which
do preserve an argument’s locking status are not considered unlock opera-
tions for that argument. Additionally, we determine if an argument is always
locked. Such arguments may be optimized as locked objects.
This analysis is iterated until a fixed point is reached. Finding function
arguments which are lock-preserving lengthens the periods in which an ob-
ject is locked, potentially causing a call previously considered as receiving an
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function unlocks(Op, obj) {
case Op is a call:
if obj passed to arg not in SafeArgs
4 return true;
case Op is an unlock annotation:
return true;
default:
return false;
9 }
do {
/* trace all locked objects */
foreach(obj in {locked annotations})
14 foreach use in uses(obj)
if (no unlocks on path obj to use)
LockedOperations .insert(use);
/* trace through function arguments to see
19 if they are lock preserving */
foreach(arg in {function arguments})
if (forall use in uses(obj):
!unlocks(use , obj))
safeArgs.insert(arg);
24
/* see if calls are always locked */
foreach(arg in safeArgs)
if (at each call to function for arg:
actual arg is locked)
29 {locked annotations}.insert(arg);
} while (any result changed);
Figure 5.2: Simplified lock analysis.
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unlocked argument to be show to always receive a locked object. More call
arguments considered lock-preserving can lengthen the apparent lifetime of
locks, causing more arguments and operations to be seen as locked.
5.2.2 Misuse of the Lock Annotation
Locks are not used perfectly and we must not expect lock annotations to be
used perfectly either. We therefore consider what happens when an annota-
tion is missing from a normally-annotated lock and when a normally-locked
object is accessed without the lock. The first case is fairly easy to prevent
when porting by folding annotation into the common locking code. An ex-
ample of this is seen in Figure 5.1 where the locking annotation is put in
down_write rather than at each use of the lock. The second case implies ex-
isting race conditions in the kernel and finding these bugs is not our goal
(though a race detector is welcome to use Recovery Domains to recover if it
detects a race). Though we expect this to cause kernel bugs, we want to have
an understanding of what happens during recovery in such a case.
Due to the non-invasiveness of Recovery Domains when there is no fault,
the behavior of the kernel does not change in the presence of either of these
errors. Absent a fault, Recovery Domains will do no more than changing the
interleaving of accesses in a lock-consistent manner.
When an object is properly locked but the lock is not annotated there is
no loss of recoverability. As with annotation, the lock will still serve as a
proxy for dependencies that may be formed. Unnecessary work will be done
checking and updating versioning, but since mutual exclusion is ensured by
the lock, recovery can reconstruct the order of operations from the undo logs
even though the locked writes didn’t record a version number. Operations in
the unannotated path will be individually versioned, but all writes will be
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between the initial version of the lock and the write that clears it. Any other
reader or writer will log the version of the lock when they lock the object
prior to writes or reads. This allows the recovery system to reconstruct a
total ordering to writes to a specific location. The only harm is a missed
opportunity to reduce overhead.
The kernel may have a race condition bug in which an object is accessed
without acquiring the locks normally required to do so. The recovery system
cannot ensure correct recovery when a race condition involves one domain
with an annotated, locked access and a domain with an unlocked access (note
that without lock annotations, correct recovery would happen).
5.3 Fresh Memory
An object is fresh when it is allocated and hasn’t yet been exposed to other
requests. Exposure happens when a pointer to it is stored in a location read-
able by another domain. This is known as escaping. As long as the pointer
isn’t stored where another domain can read it, the object hasn’t escaped. Un-
til the object escapes, we can optimize operations on it knowing that no other
domain will be reading or writing the locations.
Objects are often initialized before escaping. These accesses which initial-
ize the object can be optimized to not do any logging or versioning. Since the
recovery action for an allocation is a deallocation, the contents do not matter
until another request can read them. For an object to escape, a pointer to it
must be written to memory reachable by another request. This write which
causes the escape of the object also effectively versions the object relative to
other domains. The escaping write will set the version on the memory loca-
tion which holds the pointer to the allocated object and mark the writer as
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the allocating domain. For the object to actually escape, another domainmust
read that location. This read will form a dependency between domains. This
is the same dependency edge which would form if each location in the object
had been versioned prior to the object’s escape, thus alleviating the need to
track the initial write to the fresh object.
Initially we mark objects from allocators as being fresh. We then trace
through the control flow of the code, finding locations where an escape hap-
pens. This can be either because the address was written into another object
or global memory or because it is passed to a function. If along all paths to a
particular access, the pointer don’t escape then the access is considered fresh.
We then look at functions which have arguments which are fresh in all
contexts in which the function is called. We repeat the previous analysis on
the argument, since it is fresh. If the argument remains fresh throughout the
function, we can reconsider all calls to the function as not killing the fresh
property of the object. This allows us to repeat the previous analysis no
longer considering calls to this function as causing the object to escape; i.e. a
fixed point is reached.
5.4 Compiler Analysis
The compiler passes start by finding the fresh memory and locked memory
annotations on pointers and performing an inter-procedural, flow-sensitive
propagation of these properties on the heap objects. Standard analysis tech-
niques are used to identify constant memory objects. These properties are
queried by an instrumentation pass for each load and store and atomic op-
eration to check for several optimizations. Locked, fresh, or constant reads
need not have any instrumentation. Normal reads have two paths generated
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for them, one which calls into the runtime and one which directly executes
the load, as described in Section 5.1. The optimization in the Section 5.1 in
which a load is fast-pathed based on the dependence graph for that request
(rather than the global state of the dependence graph) is performed inside the
runtime. Locked writes are simply logged and not versioned. Fresh writes
are unlogged and not versioned.
Since we propagate information inter-procedurally, we can perform these
optimizations in functions which are passed heap objects. This, in practice,
helps in common cases of initialization functions. Objects, once constructed,
are often passed to functions which initialize various parts of them. Some
may clone an existing object, some may initialize a data structure (such as
a linked list) embedded in the object, etc. Likewise, many functions have a
precondition that the object they receive is locked. We are able to observe
that this is the case from propagating the locking analysis and take advantage
of this.
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the transformation on LLVM intermediate rep-
resentation as the equivalent transformation on C of a load and store, as well
as a sketch of the runtime.
5.5 Runtime Support
For clarity, we describe the full runtime though it is very similar in structure
to that presented in Chapter 4. The runtime consists of three main compo-
nents: undo logs, the dependence graph, and the memory versioning. Mem-
ory is versioned on a word sized boundaries. Meta-data is looked up in a 216
entry hash-table using a direct-map hash function. Meta-data entries in the
table have a lock, a last writer, and a current version number. The lock is im-
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/* Original operation */
/* i32 X = *Y */
/* RD is the current recovery domain */
4
if (fastLoads)
X = *Y;
else
X = rec_log_load_i32 (Y, RD);
9
/* simplified runtime overview */
i32 rec_log_load_i32 (Y, RD) {
Meta = get_meta_for_ptr (Y);
Meta ->lock();
14 i32 retval = *Y;
RD->depend_on(Meta ->oldwriter);
Meta ->unlock();
return retval;
}
Figure 5.3: Example load transform
plemented by stealing a bit from the last writer pointer. The last committed
version number is not maintained for entries as it is implicit in the undo logs.
This trades efficiency in the common case for extra overhead when recovering
from a fault (which is rare).
Undo logs store information about writes. They store the old value, the
size of the value, the location, and the version number of that write. Bit-
stealing schemes are used to encode the size in the other values, providing
a good space savings. Logs are stored as a singly-linked list of pages which
contain arrays of log entries. The page size is chosen to be the same as the
hardware page size.
The dependence graph is a simple graph embedded in each domain. Roots
of the graph (independent domains) are stored as a singly linked list with the
pointers embedded in each node. Additionally, a list of root domains is kept.
Domains are reference counted to prevent the need to scan dependencies of
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/* Original operation */
2 /* *Y = Val */
/* RD is the current recovery domain */
rec_log_store_i32 (Val , Y, RD);
/* or if Y is locked: */
7 rec_log_store_fastpath_i32(Val , Y, RD);
/* simplified runtime overview */
void rec_log_store_i32 (Val, Y, RD) {
Meta = get_meta_for_ptr (Y);
12 Meta ->lock();
i32 oldval = *Y;
*Y = Val;
Version = ++Meta->version;
RD->log_write(oldval, y, sizeof(i32), Version);
17 Meta ->unlock();
}
void rec_log_store_fastpath_i32(Val, Y, RD) {
Meta = get_meta_for_ptr (Y);
22 i32 oldval = *Y;
*Y = Val;
RD->log_write(oldval, y, sizeof(i32), 0);
}
Figure 5.4: Example store transform
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all domains or store an inverse graph to determine the lifetime of a domain
structure. Committed domains may still be a dependence edge for a domain
which has not committed (dependencies are directional) and we integrate the
clearing of committed domains into other update actions on the edges of a
node.
To allow the recovery system to operate, the OS must provide a unique
identifier for each thread. We implement this as a pointer stored at the bot-
tom of each kernel stack which holds the active domain for that stack. The
contents of this pointer are opaque to the OS and managed completely by the
runtime.
5.6 Porting Linux 2.6.27
We annotate Linux 2.6.27 with 360 recovery domains. These cover all in-
terrupts, system calls, allocators, and some other functions. We chose to
annotate the timer interrupt’s updating of the system time as an unlogged
domain since this domain interfered with almost all other domains. These
annotations also cover work queue dispatch routines, running each item in
the work queue as a separate domain.
We annotated 104 locking locations covering mainly the mm_struct. This
structure is used and locked extensively in the file-system and virtual memory
subsystems. While there are other structures that could be annotated, this
lock is the most performance-critical in the benchmarks.
Several inline assembly operations, such as atomic instructions and bit
twiddling, were transformed into C code or gcc intrinsics. These are repre-
sented in LLVM and allow us to transform them into the appropriate run-
time call. Inline assembly code had to, in this way, be mostly eradicated from
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the kernel so as to not miss any memory writes. Since we do not guarantee
consistency of user applications, we could leave the assembly routines which
copy into and out of user-space alone.
Some inter-procedural optimizations had to be disabled in LLVM when
processing the whole-kernel byte-code. Per-directory byte-code was fully
inter-procedurally optimized in all directories but arch/x86/kernel. Other
minor changes went into the kernel to reduce its dependency on gcc behavior.
5.7 Conclusion
Static and dynamic analysis provide a strong basis for reducing the amount
of tracking necessary for Recovery Domains. Small amounts of additional
annotation expose the structure of parts of the kernel to the recovery com-
piler allowing several new optimizations to be applied. Keeping in the spirit
of being able to incrementally port a kernel to Recovery Domains, these op-
timizations can be applied incrementally also.
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Chapter 6
Results
We implemented the systems described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 and eval-
uated them on a variety of workloads. We considered three metrics during
evaluation:
Coverage: The theoretical coverage of the recovery technique in terms of
fraction of execution covered by the technique.
Survivability: The ability to recover from injected faults in the covered por-
tions of code.
Performance: The overhead incurred during normal (i.e., fault-free) execu-
tion of the kernel.
We did not directly measure the recovery time, which would give a mea-
sure of availability under potential denial-of-service attacks. We have ob-
served that recovery times are extremely short, far shorter than typical times
for a partial or complete reboot of the system.
Two implementations of Recovery Domains exist, one for the system de-
scribed in Chapter 4 and one for the system described in Chapter 5. For the
first implementation of Recovery Domains, we use the Linux 2.4.22 kernel
used in the previous memory safety work in SVA [21] and a port of Linux
2.6.27 to SVA. These ports were limited to a few benchmarks due to bugs in
the SVA runtime; all benchmarks that would run on the kernel without Re-
covery Domains ran on the kernel with Recovery Domains. For the second
86
implementation of Recovery Domains with the optimizations in Chapter 5,
we use a native (non-SVA) Linux 2.6.27 kernel. We replace much of the in-
line assembly code in this kernel with compiler intrinsics which replicate the
behavior. This kernel runs all benchmarks we tried without error.
6.1 Methodology
We select a variety of workloads on which to benchmark. These are:
postmark: a mail server benchmark with 1000 simultaneous files and 500000
transactions
bzip2: compressing a 17MB wav file at default options
gcc: compiling liblame
povray: rendering the install test scene
scp: transferring five 17MB wav files
scp -C: transferring five 17MB wav files with compression
apache: transferring an empty HTML file 100000 times
apache (k): same as apache but reusing a single TCP connection
postgresql: PostgreSQL running pgbench to simulate a TPC-B [76] like
workload
We ran each benchmark at least six times, after an initial warm-up run, and
looked at cumulative result of those consecutive runs. For network bench-
marks we measured a maximum standard deviation of less than 1% in run-
times and considerably lower for other workloads. Overhead was calculated
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against an equivalently-compiled kernel without recovery instrumentation.
This kernel is source-identical to the recovery kernel and compiled with iden-
tical optimizations. Coverage was measured by using a modified runtime
which tracks whether a memory operation was performed in a logged (re-
coverable) or unlogged domain. We instrument all memory operations and
classify them as reads, writes, or atomic operations.
We test on an Intel Core i7-860 in KVM, Linux’s in-kernel hypervisor,
with frequency scaling and hyper-threading disabled. The client for network
tests is connected to the test machine with one 1Gb Ethernet switch. The
kernel network and block devices are the virtio devices provided by KVM.
To validate the results using KVM, we ran the benchmarks directly on native
hardware (an AthlonMP). The results we obtained were similar, showing that
the results on KVM are representative of real hardware.
6.2 Survivability
To test how often a fault was unrecoverable (within the covered fraction
of code measured above), we inserted potential fault-injecting code in ev-
ery basic block of the kernel. During kernel execution, this code triggered a
fault (that would normally be fatal) in a randomly chosen basic block every
300,000+rand(0...300,000) basic blocks (where rand was recalculated after a
fault). These faults were only injected during logged intervals to focus on the
theoretically covered fraction of code. Faults were repeatedly injected until
the kernel crashed, deadlocked, or otherwise obviously failed. The above in-
jection rate corresponded to roughly about four faults every second of kernel
execution. At this rate, many non-trivial kernel operations would take a fatal
fault without Recovery Domains.
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For the reference system, we repeated this experiment five times, each
running a workload that included booting up the kernel, logging in as root
and beginning to run the postmark application. Over these five runs, the
kernel survived an average 35.4 faults (range: 17 to 72) before crashing. This
means that on average, the kernel survived over 97.2% of faults in the covered
portion of the execution.
For the optimized system, we performed a similar, but more targeted,
experiment. Faults were injected as before, but only after a target workload
was started. This tests a more realistic workload than booting the system
and running postmark. Apache was the first workload. We performed 16
fault injection experiments on apache. The kernel survived an average 21
consecutive faults (range: 2 to 98). Postgresql was the second workload. We
performed 6 fault injection experiments on postgresql. The kernel survived
an average of 17 consecutive faults (range: 3 to 35).
The optimized system has fewer average successful recoveries than the
reference system. However, these tests were run on more varied and more
realistic workloads. Further, the runtime used was newer and less well tested.
We examined which kernel domains encountered the final, fatal fault in each
of the runs, but, perhaps surprisingly, did not notice any clear pattern there.
It is difficult to isolate exactly what kernel state corruption caused the fault
to be fatal in each experiment. We observed that the final, non-survived
fault occurred in the kernel entrypoints sys_open, sys_read, do_softirq,
sys_mprotect, sys_sendfile, and sys_brk. The entrypoint do_softirq
was the most common. The frequency of crashes in these entrypoints cor-
rosponds roughly with the percentage of time spent by the kernel in these
requests.
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Benchmark
Reference Implementation Optimized Implementation
#Mem Ops Coverage #Mem Ops Coverage
find 47M 67% - -
postmark 70B 96% 47.6B 97%
gcc 130M 31% 196.4M 96%
bzip2 63M 34% 88.3M 80%
povray - - 11.8M 71%
scp - - 682.6M 97%
scp -C - - 570.6M 96%
apache (k) - - 797.0M 69%
apache - - 2.5B 87%
Table 6.1: Percent of Dynamic Memory Operations By Domain Type
We suspect, but have not verified, that recovery mechanism failures were
due to conditions in which recovery mechanisms could not recover, due to an
unlogged domain, for example, or due to bugs in the implementation of the
recovery system. Distinguishing these appears non-trivial due to the diffi-
culty in debugging kernel code and the corruption of state (full-system simu-
lators with deterministic replay have been the most useful in debugging these
failures, but very slow). Several crashes, we suspect, are due to not completely
handling all memory-like state. Page-table base-pointers and interrupt flags
are examples of state which could be easily tracked by the runtime, but cur-
rently are not.
Overall, the key observation we make from this experiment is that the
optimized recovery kernel is able to survive a large number of faults before
failing. Together, the experimental results show that Recovery Domains are
now efficient enough to be practical for real-world use, while still remaining
highly effective at recovering from faults.
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6.3 Coverage
An important metric in evaluating the recovery mechanism is how often the
kernel is executing in code regions that are recoverable. Since the implemen-
tation “trusts” the scheduler and small portions of other codes as annotated
by the programmer with unlogged domains, this will be less than the entire
execution of the kernel.
As a proxy for execution time, we measured the number of memory oper-
ations (loads and stores) performed in each type of domain. we used several
benchmarks: postmark (which simulates a mail server), find, gcc, bzip2, and
a Linux kernel compile. The last two were not run on the SVA 2.4 kernel due
to instability inherited from SVA. Postmark was run for 500K file transac-
tions, find searching a tree of 2537 directories and 37822 files totaling 960MB
for a specific filename, bzip2 compressing a 17MB file, and gcc compiling li-
blame (a multimedia library) at -O3. Compiling liblame involved compiling
20 C files (totaling about 28 KLOC) and linking them into a shared library
with ld. The testing of find was not duplicated for the implementation with
optimizations because the original filesystem had been lost by the time the
second system was implemented.
Table 6.1 shows that for file-system intensive applications like postmark
and to some extent find, coverage ranges from 64% to 97% in the reference
implementation. However for read and write intensive workloads, coverage
is considerably lower. File-system intensive applications spend more time
exercising the data structures in the file-system and VFS-layer code, rather
than just doing device IO, thus more of the execution time is spent in system
call code, which has excellent coverage. In the implementation discussed in
Chapter 5, most of the interrupt handlers are treated as logged domains which
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improves coverage in IO intensive workloads dramatically.
When we look at the implementation with optimizations, we see in Ta-
ble 6.1 that coverage for postmark is mostly unchanged between the two im-
plementations, but bzip2 and gcc show a 2.4x and 3.1x increase in coverage.
This comes from running various deferred-work work-queues that are run
after an interrupt in recoverable domains, unlike in previous work. We run
the time-updating code in the timer interrupt as an unlogged domain which
accounts for most of the unlogged operations in povray.
For bzip2 and gcc, we see that both execute a higher fraction of memory
operations in recoverable domains and a larger absolute number of opera-
tions in recoverable domains. Table 6.4 shows that we have a considerable
performance gain in these cases. Thus we are not reducing overhead simply
by having fewer operations.
The number of kernel memory operations in each benchmark is not com-
parable between the old and new Recovery Domains implementation. Since
the numbers are for different kernel versions, they are quantifying different
algorithms and behaviors. However they sever to illustrate the amount of
work the various benchmarks do while in the kernel.
The coverage numbers show that the performance gains we achieve come
without reducing the percentage of the system that is recoverable. Rather, we
improve coverage considerably.
6.4 Performance
Ideally, during error-free execution, Recovery Domains would impose as lit-
tle overhead as possible. We first examine the performance overheads of the
reference system from Chapter 4 and compare it to several baseline kernels
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without Recovery Domains. Then we turn to the optimized system from
Chapter 5, comparing it to the reference system.
6.4.1 Performance of Reference System
To isolate the overhead of Recovery Domains in the reference implementa-
tion, we measured benchmark run-times under three different kernels: the
original 2.4.22 kernel compiled with gcc, the SVA ported 2.4.22 kernel com-
piled with LLVM, and the SVA ported 2.4.22 kernel with Recovery Domains,
also compiled with LLVM. Comparing the first two options shows the over-
head due to SVA alone. However, the overhead of the recovery techniques
in this paper (and their design) are relatively orthogonal to any overheads
caused by SVA itself, and comparing the latter two kernels isolates the over-
head of the recovery techniques. All these measurements were taken using
KVM (Linux’s support for virtualization hardware on modern processors)
on an Intel Core2 6420 running at 2.13GHz. We used the same benchmarks
as in the coverage experiment with the same machine configuration. All per-
formance measurements used the average of three runs; the variability was
very low.
Memory usage by the recovery system was never directly measured. We
noted, however, that the statically allocated 32MB of memory was never ex-
hausted.
Native Kernel SVA Recovery Recovery vs. SVA
postmark 124 178 1004 5.6x
bzip2 13 12 13 1.08x
gcc(liblame) 23 23 29 1.26x
Table 6.2: Run-times (seconds) of benchmarks on Linux 2.4.22
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Native Kernel Recovery Recovery vs. Native
postmark 336 2741 8.16x
bzip2 12 16 1.33x
gcc(liblame) 28 55 1.96x
kernel compile 683 1988 2.9x
Table 6.3: Run-times (seconds) of benchmarks on Linux 2.6.27.5
Table 6.2 shows that the system-call intensive Postmark program is
slowed down by about a factor of 5.6x. The other two benchmarks show
low overhead due to Recovery Domains: 8% and 26% respectively. Over-
all, although the overhead for postmark is high, we believe this benchmark
represents an extreme case for Recovery Domains. Furthermore, we are op-
timistic that these overheads can be greatly reduced by eliminating significant
bottlenecks in this prototype implementation.
In addition to the Linux 2.4.22 kernel, we ran the benchmark applications
on a port the 2.6 Linux kernel and measured the overhead of my recovery
kernel relative to a native 2.6 Linux kernel. This port was functional but
untuned due to both using a new runtime and the behavioral differences in
the different kernel versions. Preliminary results are encouraging with 1.33x
overhead for bzip2, 1.96x overhead for gcc, and 8.16x overhead for postmark.
In addition, a kernel compile benchmark of Linux 2.6.27.6 configured with
"allyesconfig" was run with 2.9x overhead. The results are summarized in
table 6.3.
6.4.2 Performance of Recovery Domains With
Optimizations
We evaluate the performance of Recovery Domains with optimizations by
comparing to three cases. We compare to results for the runtime from chap-
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Benchmark Reference runtime New Runtime for Linux 2.6.27
2.4.22 2.6.27 Non-optimized Optimized
postmark 460% 716% 744% 134%
bzip2 8% 33% 3% 1%
gcc 26% 96% 13% 4%
povray - - 2% 2%
scp - - 50% 12%
scp -C - - 19% 4%
apache - - 5% 0%
apache (k) - - 20% 5%
postgresql - - 38% 12%
Table 6.4: Overheads as a percent of runtime over the same kernel without
Recovery Domains
ter 4 for the Linux 2.4.22 kernel, the results using the same runtime on the
Linux 2.6.27 kernel, the current runtime without the optimizations described
in this chapter on the Linux 2.6.27 kernel, and the optimized Recovery Do-
mains on the Linux 2.6.27 kernel. Since many optimizations and quite a bit
of tuning went into the new runtime, comparisons between the optimized
runtime and the runtime from Chapter 4 are given for perspective and com-
pleteness. The comparison between the 2.4 and 2.6 kernel gives an intuition
for how much the recovery workload differs between the two very different
Linux kernels.
Comparing performance of the optimized system to the reference imple-
mentation shows dramatic improvement. Though the reference implementa-
tion has a limited number of benchmarks, for those it does have we compare
extremely favorably. Table 6.4 shows the percent overhead of recovery on
various benchmarks. In postmark, which is a pathological case of file-system
overhead, we see a factor of 3.4 improvement over the results for the refer-
ence system on 2.4.22. A more interesting comparison is the new runtime
with and without the optimizations we describe. Here we see a factor of 3.8
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Benchmark
All
Optimizations
without
load
fastpath
without
fresh
memory
without
locked
memory
postmark 134% 601% 175% 156%
bzip2 1% 5% 1% 1%
gcc 4% 12% 6% 6%
povray 2% 2% 2% 0%
scp 12% 42% 17% 14%
scp -C 4% 16% 7% 6%
apache 0% 4% 2% 1%
apache (k) 5% 16% 10% 7%
postgresql 12% 35% 15% 16%
Table 6.5: Overheads of Recovery Domains without various optimizations
improvement.
While the improvement in postmark is notable, because postmark was a
worst case, the improvement in more realistic workloads is just as dramatic.
All except postmark have overheads of 12% or less with optimized recovery,
and all but two are 5% or less. Moreover, without the new optimizations
described in this work, the overheads would be much higher, e.g., 41% for
PostgreSQL and 50% for scp without compression.
To evaluate how much each individual optimization contributes to these
improvements in the presence of all other optimizations, Table 6.5 shows the
effects of turning off each optimization while leaving all others enabled. Each
should be compared with the overheads with all optimizations enabled (col-
umn 2). We see that all the optimizations matter, though disabling fast-path
loads hurts the overheads the most.
We find that fresh-memory analysis is especially helpful in the network
intensive benchmarks. The most data transfer intensive benchmark, scp, ex-
emplifies this. We found during profiling that a kernel structure was being
cloned in the network stack, causing a significant number of writes to the
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fresh object.
We also see a gain from locked memory analysis, but not as large as the
other optimizations. This is, in part, due to the extra annotation burden. An-
notating locks requires understanding the locking discipline for each struc-
ture in the kernel and each type of lock. While many important cases are
fairly easy to annotate, others are too fine grained. Most of the performance
improvement we see here comes from annotating the locks of mm_struct.
This plays an important role in optimizing common functions in the virtual
memory system. However, trying to apply the same optimization to journal
heads in the journaling layer used by ext3 proves significantly harder and un-
profitable, at least to the extent we annotated it. Unlike the virtual memory
system which locked whole objects and trees with a single lock, the journal
layer took out locks to find and set individual bits. These operations meant
the journaling code did little work in explicit locked regions and the cost of
using the lock as a proxy for the object was more than the cost of the read
and write that were protected by the lock.
In addition to the tests we list above, we also tested a program, mplayer,
that has soft real-time requirements for frame decoding, to ensure that it is
able to meet those requirements. In our tests, we found that mplayer dropped
no frames in any configuration of Recovery Domains optimizations.
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Chapter 7
Example Use With a Model Fault
Detector
Recovery Domains enable recovery from detected faults, but do not provide
a method of detecting faults. There have been significant research efforts to
develop automatic fault detectors and to integrate those into operating sys-
tems. XFI [83], SVA [21, 22], CCured [55], SFI [84], and SAFECODE [24]
are all examples of user- or kernel-space fault detectors. These and similar
fault detectors improve safety but not reliability. Recovery Domains can be
used by these fault detectors to provide a complete system capable of not
only detecting faults, but recovering from faults and continuing execution.
Work on Recovery Domains was specifically inspired by work on Se-
cure Virtual Architectures (SVA). Specifically, SVA provides a basis for the
memory-safe execution of operating system kernels written in C (or another
non-typesafe language). When memory safety of the operating system built
on SVA is violated, SVA halts the machine. Further reflection on this scenario
directly led to designing Recovery Domains so that memory faults could be
recovered from, not merely detected. This chapter uses SVA as a prototypi-
cal fault detector to both illuminate the interaction between fault detector and
Recovery Domains and to provide, speculatively, a complete use of Recovery
Domains.
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7.1 SVA Overview
SVA consists of two major components. The first is an API which wraps
access to hardware functions, such as page tables, allowing higher-level,
compiler-driven reasoning about the actions of operating systems. The sec-
ond component, built on that foundation, is a memory safety system.
The hardware abstraction ABI provides a way to understand, restrict, ab-
stract, andmodify the use of (mostly) processor features by the operating sys-
tem. For example, abstracting page tables to the ABI allows systems, such as
memory safety, to validate that state changes conform to certain rules. Mem-
ory safety requires that kernel pages not be double-mapped, which it can
enforce by monitoring changes to the page table which must occur via the
ABI.
SVA contains a version of SAFECODE [24] specialized for operating sys-
tem environments. This provides several important safety guarantees for op-
erating systems written in unsafe languages, such as C. SVA aims to enforce
fine-grained (object level) memory safety, control-flow integrity, type safety
for a subset of objects, and a sound operational semantics even with dangling-
pointer errors.
These guarantees are ensured by instrumenting the code to monitor mem-
ory accesses and pointer arithmetic. SVA uses a pointer analysis (Data Struc-
ture Analysis [48]) to discover which pointers may point to which object
and to optimize bounds checks and object lookup based on this analysis.
Type-safe objects, as discovered by the pointer analysis, require fewer checks.
Pointer analysis allows instrumentation of indirect function calls to ensure
the target function is one known to be acceptable to that call-site by the com-
piler. Pointer analysis allows optimizations over existing object bounds stor-
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age techniques. Existing techniques store bounds information either as “fat
pointers”, which embed object bounds inside pointers by enlarging the point-
ers, or in a global table of all objects. Fat pointers, as used in CCured [55],
break existing code by changing the size of pointers, causing interfaces to
change and disrupting hard-coded pointer arithmetic in structures contain-
ing pointers. A large table of all objects in the system, as used by Jones
and Kelly [43], creates a scalability problem as the number of objects grows.
Rather than having a table which maps all objects to object meta-data (such as
start address and length), tables are stored per points-to set discovered by the
pointer analysis. This reduces the number of entries which must be searched
through to find an object (or the lack of an object) for an arbitrary memory
address.
The instrumentation amounts to: recording the creation of objects, in-
cluding their bounds; checking bounds after pointer arithmetic; checking that
objects exist before a load or store; checking that an address is the start of an
object before a deallocation; checking that an indirect call is calling an ex-
pected function, found by compiler analysis; and recording the deallocation
of objects.
7.2 SVA As a Driver For Recovery
As a fault detector, SVA is ideal. It detects faults at the time a bug oc-
curs, rather than after corruption. When a fault is detected, the system is
halted. This prevents corrupted state in the OS. Further, by providing mem-
ory safety, the recovery runtime is protected from memory bugs in the op-
erating system. This alleviates many of the sources of potential corruption
to the runtime by the operating system. Because a fault is triggered before
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a stray write (or read) happens, no memory error can corrupt the runtime.
A detector which triggered a fault far from the activation site could allow
corruption to happen to the runtime.
Recovery Domains also do not interfere with SVA’s notion of ’object’.
SVA monitors allocations and deallocations, forming runtime knowledge of
what language-level objects exist in the kernel address space. Since alloca-
tors are undone by an inverse operation, namely the deallocator, the existing
SVA monitoring code for those allocators will maintain a consistent notion
of objects even in the event of a rollback.
The use of a kernel ported to the hardware ABI can simplify a few im-
portant operations. First, atomic operations exist as calls to the ABI which
are compiled to LLVM intrinsics. This removes the need for either porting of
atomic operations to intrinsics just for recovery or the recognition of com-
mon inline assembly code sequences (which tend to be unique to each op-
erating system). Secondly, since the register state is handled by the ABI for
interrupts and process switching, the in-memory format of the saved regis-
ters is known. This allows the recovery system to directly restore the register
and control state of suspended processes rather than having to instrument
threads to verify that they were rolled back while suspended and to perform
the register and control restoration after they are awakened.
SVA thus forms a model fault detector for Recovery Domains. Neither
interfere with the assumptions of the other. SVA is greedy; SVA triggers
faults without allowing the corrupting action to happen. When a memory
fault happens, no corrupt state has been written thus protecting the recovery
system from its most prominent source of bugs that could prevent recovery.
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void func1() {
void* x = alloca();
sva_register(x);
...
5 sva_unregister(x);
return;
}
void func2() {
10 void* y = alloca();
sva_register(y);
...
sva_unregister(y);
return;
15 }
void func3() {
void* z = alloca();
sva_register(z);
20 func1();
func2();
...
sva_unregister(z);
return;
25 }
Figure 7.1: Overlapping stack allocations
7.3 SVA Integration
Recovery Domains and SVA can coexist with few changes. SVA’s memory
safety compiler is first run over the kernel instrumenting it for safety. Then
the Recovery Domains compiler is run over the result. The runtimes for both
systems are linked into the kernel.
The systems do not mesh perfectly. One change is required for correct-
ness. Two other changes will lower the overhead of the combined system.
One area where stacking the transforms does not work is in the case
of stack allocations. Address-taken local variables or programmer-allocated
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stack memory cause the creation of non-heap objects which must be tracked
by SVA. SVA requires the registration of these allocations with the runtime
as objects, which it performs automatically as part of its compiler passes. Re-
covery Domains assume stack allocations will be undone when the stack is
rolled back. During recovery, stack objects registered with the SVA runtime
must be unregistered. This cannot be achieved by registering inverse actions
with the Recovery Domains runtime to undo the registration of stack objects.
Consider figure 7.1. The stack objects in func1 and func2may overlap when
those functions are called from func3. Since only one function is active, this
isn’t a problem in normal execution. However, if inverse actions were reg-
istered, by the end if func3, there would be three registered inverse actions
to undo stack objects, yet these objects would already be freed. For heap
objects, Recovery Domains defer deallocation to prevent this case, but for
stack allocations this is not possible since control flow implicitly deallocates
the objects. To solve this, either stack objects need to be promoted to heap
objects or Recovery Domains need to provide an inverse action stack which
can have actions removed if they no longer apply.
Two other changes are desirable, but not necessary to integrate the two
systems. The main effect of not performing these optimizations is extra log-
ging and loss of optimization opportunities. First, SVA introduces newmem-
ory locations to store bounds information obtained from the runtime. These
address-taken temporaries should be ignored by the recovery system. These
are easily identified since their only uses are by SVA runtime function calls.
Second, many objects would appear address-taken and escaping by the re-
covery system if considered without knowledge of SVA’s instrumentation.
Objects are passed to the SVA runtime regularly. This does not represent a
true escape and should be ignored by the recovery system.
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struct fib_info * fib_create_info (
const struct rtmsg *r, struct kern_rta *rta,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int *errp) {
...
5 if (fib_props[r->rtm_type].scope > r->rtm_scope)
goto err_inval;
...
fi = kmalloc(sizeof(*fi)+nhs*sizeof(struct
fib_nh), GFP_KERNEL);
10 ...
memset(fi,0,sizeof(*fi)+nhs*sizeof(...));
if (rta->rta_priority) {
temp = rta ->priority;
15 fi->fib_priority = *temp;
}
...
}
Figure 7.2: Original kernel source for purposes of an SVA and Recovery Do-
mains example.
7.3.1 Source Transformation Example
To clarify the combined compiler transformation of source by the safety
compiler from SVA and the recovery compiler from recovery domains, we
present an example of how the transformations stack. The example is sim-
plified in several ways. First, for readability, the example is given at the C
language level. This involves no loss of generality. Second, the accessing and
caching of the active recovery domain is omitted. Details on that can be found
in previous chapters.
Figure 7.2 is taken from the SOSP 2007 paper [21] on SVA. The exam-
ple is an excerpt of fib_create_info from the Linux 2.4.22 network stack.
This function allocates a data structure for new routes. The example shows
dynamic array indexing, allocation, memory functions (which are dealt with
specially by both SVA and Recovery Domains), and memory accesses.
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MetaPool MP1 , MP2;
2
struct fib_info * fib_create_info (
const struct rtmsg *r, struct kern_rta *rta,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int *errp) {
...
7 //look up object bounds and then check the access
getBounds(MP1 , &fib_props , &s, &e);
boundscheck(s, &fib_props[r->rtm_type].scope , e)
if (fib_props[r->rtm_type].scope > r->rtm_scope)
goto err_inval;
12 ...
fi = kmalloc(sizeof(*fi)+nhs*sizeof(struct
fib_nh), GFP_KERNEL);
pchk_reg_obj(MP2, fi, 96, NULL, SVA_KMALLOC);
...
17 //check bounds for memset without lookup since
//we know the start and size from the kmalloc
boundscheck(fi, (char*)fi + 95, (char*)fi + 96);
memset(fi,0,sizeof(*fi)+nhs*sizeof(...));
22 //check that rta is a valid object
lscheck(MP1, rta);
if (rta->rta_priority) {
//check that rta->rta_priority is valid
temp = rta ->priority;
27 lscheck(MP2 , temp);
fi->fib_priority = *temp;
}
...
}
Figure 7.3: Example of kernel source instrumented by SVA to provide mem-
ory safety. Added instrumentation is in bold.
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Figure 7.3 comes directly from [21] and shows the various instrumenta-
tion performed by the safety compiler. The added instrumentation is in bold.
On line 8 the bounds of fib_props are looked up and the indexing on line
9 is checked by line 9 to ensure it stays in bounds. Line 15 registers an ob-
ject newly created by the allocator with the runtime. Line 19 checks that the
memset will stay inbounds. The check is against an object locally allocated
so the bounds information can be forwarded from the allocation site to the
check rather than looking it up.
Figure 7.4 builds on figure 7.3 by including instrumentation for recovery.
New instrumentation is in bold. To improve readability, temporary variables,
whose names start with rd, are introduced to store the result of loads.
While this is a straight-forward replacement of loads and stores by
rec_dom_load and rec_dom_store, a couple things should be explained.
First, on line 28, memset was replaced by a call into the runtime to perform
the memset. Memset streams a number of stores and can be specialized to
more optimally interact with both locking, logging, and checks for optimized
code paths. Second, kmalloc is an allocator and treated specially by the Re-
covery Domains system. However it does not appear so from this example.
This is because the setup, tear down, error virtualization, and inverse logging
for the allocator happen inside a wrapper created around kmalloc. This sim-
plifies the transform as no call sites need to be modified when introducing
Recovery Domains. Thus the call appears unchanged in this example.
In the full system, the fresh memory optimization would remove the call
to rec_dom_memset and call a memset routine which performed no logging.
This is possible because fi has not escaped by line 28.
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MetaPool MP1, MP2;
struct fib_info * fib_create_info(
4 const struct rtmsg *r, struct kern_rta *rta,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh , int *errp) {
...
//look up object bounds and then check the access
getBounds (MP1 , &fib_props , &s, &e);
9 rd1 = rec_dom_load(&r->rtm_type , ActiveRD);
boundscheck(s, &fib_props [rd1].scope , e)
rd2 = rec_dom_load(&r->rtm_scope , ActiveRD);
rd3 = rec_dom_load(&fib_props [rd1].scope , ActiveRD);
if (rd3 > rd2)
14 goto err_inval ;
...
fi = kmalloc (sizeof (*fi)+nhs*sizeof(struct
fib_nh), GFP_KERNEL );
//kmalloc is an independent domain and has
19 //effectively registered an kfree as an inverse by:
//rec_dom_log_inverse(kfree, fi)
pchk_reg_obj(MP2 , fi, 96, NULL , SVA_KMALLOC);
...
//check bounds for memset without lookup since
24 //we know the start and size from the kmalloc
boundscheck(fi, (char*)fi + 95, (char*)fi + 96);
//memset is specialized in the recovery domain
//runtime for efficiency
rec_dom_memset(fi,0,sizeof (*fi)+nhs*sizeof (...),
29 ActiveRD);
//check that rta is a valid object
lscheck (MP1 , rta);
rd3 = rec_dom_load(&rta ->rta_priority , ActiveRD);
if (rd3) {
34 //check that rta->rta_priority is valid
lscheck(MP2 , rd3);
rd4 = rec_dom_load(rd3 , ActiveRD);
rec_dom_store(&fi->fib_priority , rd4 , ActiveRD);
}
39 ...
}
Figure 7.4: Example of kernel source instrumented by SVA to provide mem-
ory safety then instrumented by Recovery Domains to provide recovery. In-
strumentation added by Recovery Domains is in bold. ActiveRD is short for
the active recovery domain. Accessing the active recovery domain is omitted
for clarity.
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7.3.2 Faulting Example
If a fault occurred at line 31 in figure 7.4, the SVA runtime would call
rec_abort. The machine would be paused as the memory state was reverted.
Since kmalloc is an independent domain, its changes to the state would not be
reverted in this phase. After the memory state was reverted, the inverse oper-
ations would be performed. One such operation would be to call kfreewith
the pointer returned at line 16. This would undo the effect of the kmalloc
semantically. Control flow would resume from the start of the domain and
recovery would be complete.
Since SVA cares about objects and their boundaries, maintaining matched
frees to allocations is required during recovery to keep consistent meta-data
for the SVA runtime. Thus the inverse for kmalloc needs to be a wrapper
around kfreewhich also calls SVA to unregister the object being deallocated.
7.3.3 Differences Preventing Merging of Runtimes
Although it would be nice to be able to share work between the SVA runtime
and the recovery runtime, there is not an obvious way to do this. This comes
from fairly different requirements on meta-data and what is instrumented.
SVA is primarily interested in objects. Objects are the language level con-
struct against which it is basing its protections. Thus it must lookup meta-
data for a region of memory corresponding to an object from an arbitrary
address. To do this it maintains a modified splay tree in which the nodes are
non-overlapping memory ranges. This allows it to find meta-data for an ob-
ject given any address inside the object. This lookup supports checking for
existence of objects (as in the lscheck) as well as retrieving the bounds of ob-
jects (via the getBounds call). Since meta-data is per-object, it is desirable to
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minimize per-location overhead. Having a range lookup structure minimizes
space usage by having a fixed overhead per-object rather than per-location
and not having any memory use for unallocated memory.
Recovery Domains concerns itself with changes to memory locations. It
is not tied to higher level concepts like objects. Further, to protect the entire
kernel, it must protect allocators, which operate on pre-C-language-object
memory. Thus, by necessity, it cannot operate strictly on an object level.
Objects allow semantic optimization of recovery through inverses, but are
not necessary constructs for recovery; recovery semantics make sense from a
memory location standpoint, not from an object standpoint. Since potentially
every load and store is instrumented, and loads and stores are a large fraction
of the code executed, every effort is made to ensure extremely fast processing
of them. To do this, a direct lookup structure, in this case a hash-table, with
no chaining, is used to provide fast constant-time lookups. Speed requires
that two locations which hash to the same meta-data bucket alias.
To place recovery meta-data inside the object meta-data of SVA would
require using per-location memory, greatly expanding the size of meta-data
and making it variable length. Each load and store would have a considerably
more costly lookup, even if the required node was near the root of the tree.
Placing SVA object meta-data inside recovery meta-data, by adding a chain
of objects aliased by a location would increase the overhead of meta-data
by 33%. Creating and destroying objects would also be more costly as all
locations in that object would have to be updated.
There are situations in which some work can be shared. When a domain
starts or ends, the recovery system must take a global lock. SVA, similarly
needs a lock when registering allocated objects. These locks could be shared.
A similar situation exists on an SVA load-store check.
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7.4 Conclusion
SVA integrates with Recovery Domains with almost no changes to either. A
few changes are necessary to keep SVA’s runtime consistent with the kernel
allocators in the event of rollback. SVA’s memory safety pairs well with re-
covery since errors are detected before they are executed. This allows precise
error recovery of the affected threads since the fault and the error are at the
same location.
SVA’s memory safety protects the recovery runtime from several methods
of corruption which could prohibit recovery or cause recovery to produce
unintended state. SVA, as published in [21] is vulnerable to the same page
re-mapping corruption which recovery domains is, but work has been done
on preventing this in [20].
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Chapter 8
Related Work
In addition to the projects already discussed in this dissertation, work on
Recovery Domains is related to several categories of previous research:
transactional systems, techniques for recovering from faults in operating sys-
tems, and programming language support for recovering from faults. Many
projects focus on fault isolationwithin the OS through newOS architectures,
changes to commodity OS kernels, or language-based techniques.
This chapter starts with a discussion on the limits of recovery, which
drives the design of RecoveryDomains. Then three basic recovery techniques
are reviewed, from very basic to complex. Then, specific recovery systems
proposed in the literature are discussed. Finally, the studies of the limitations
of both automated recovery and various recovery mechanisms are reviewed.
Avoiding the limits of various recovery techniques, in part, drives the design
of Recovery Domains and will be discussed at the end of the chapter.
8.1 Limits of Recovery
Automatic recovery is not without its limitations. Several studies look at
the types of bugs encountered by various systems and whether re-execution
would re-trigger them, how much and how often state should be saved to
avoid checkpointing corrupted state, and how automatic can recovery be and
still be successful.
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Chandra and Chen [16] look at the types of faults encountered by sev-
eral applications and classify them into three categories. The first category,
comprising 72-87% of faults were independent of the operating environment
and would be re-triggered by any generic, transparent recovery mechanism.
Of the remaining faults, half were dependent on an operating environment
that was unlikely to change. The remaining faults were transient faults, faults
dependent on non-determinism or on state likely to have changed during
transparent recovery. This supports the argument of this dissertation that
permanent bugs (the first two categories in the study) are an important target
for recovery, and systems which merely recover from transient faults by small
changes to the environment are insufficient to handle large classes of faults.
Further work by Lowell, Chandra, and Chen [51] show a tension in trans-
parent recovery between not losing user-visible state and losing corrupted
state, hence allowing recovery. If execution since the last checkpoint has not
caused output, rollback can happen with no user-visible effects. This can
be ensured by checkpointing after at least every operation that causes user-
visible changes. However, they show this has a high risk of saving corrupt
state (thus producing incorrect output). If checkpoints are less frequent, cor-
rupt state is saved less often, but corrupt output is visible to the user. This
argues in favor of the decision to not make recovery domains transparent
to programmers. By exposing faults, but providing strong guaranties about
state, the programmer is able to reason about state after a fault and control the
visibility of the fault (by failing the operation, retrying, etc.) as appropriate
for that operation.
Chandra and Chen [17] also study how successfully a system recovers
from faults using checkpointing on a continuum of state sizes and frequen-
cies. At one end, programmer-supplied checkpointing saves a subset of pro-
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gram state when the programmer deems it necessary. By minimizing the
amount of state saved, the likelihood of the state being corrupted, and hence
cause the fault to be re-executed, is minimized. At the far end of the spectrum
is automatic checkpointing which saves the entire state before any output-
commit. Although application-specific checkpointing performs significantly
better than generic checkpointing, faults injected into the application cause
1-19% percent of application-specific recovery systems to recover incorrect
state and 27-41% of generic recovery systems to recover incorrect state, lead-
ing to incorrect results.
8.1.1 Limits of Recovery-Oriented Operating Systems
Several operating systems have been constructed with recovery as a goal of
the design. These systems illustrate the need for recovery domains even in
the presence of novel system organizations.
Minix3 [41], a microkernel, includes a server responsible for restarting
failed servers. In practice, this creates an ad-hoc fault handling system. Since
servers have state, a failed server loses the state of all clients using it. In the
case of the network server, all open connections would be lost. This puts the
burden of recovery on every client for every type of server they use. Failures
of some components, such as the file system, prevent recovery since the rein-
carnation server depends on them. While state can be stored in a state storage
server, doing so increases the risk of restoring corrupted state, as well as in-
troducing more dependencies for successful recovery. Recovery Domains
would supplement this recovery mechanism by exposing failed requests to
the client in a uniform way (or at least in a way they should be able to handle
in normal fault-free operation) while preventing unexpected state loss due to
a restart.
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Chorus [64] includes support for a type of sub-system-specific check-
pointing and restart ability [6]. Servers (or actors in Chorus) may check-
point a representation of their state in a persistent region of memory. To the
programmer this is simply support for programmer-supplied checkpointing
discussed in 8.1. On a server restart, all state and resources except the check-
pointed state are destroy, then the server is restarted and initialized with its
saved state. As discussed in 8.1 this approach does not guarantee correct state
after a restart.
EROS [71, 70] includes continuous checkpointing. Continuous check-
pointing periodically marks all objects as copy-on-write and asynchronously
writes out the state to disk. If an object in the checkpoint is modified it will be
copied and the copy modified, thus not tainting the in-progress checkpoint.
However, correctness of restart in this system is dependent on not having
corrupted state in the checkpoint, a problem discussed in 8.1.
CuriOS [23] allows servers to bind client state as protected objects. These
objects are strongly isolated, they are only available to the server when it
is processing the client’s request. The hope is that on a server restart, having
client state protected allows a server to continue processing requests from the
client. This again depends on not saving corrupted state. If state is corrupted
and all necessary state to process a request is per-client, then after several
retries, the client and its state can be killed. Further, the authors acknowledge
that “restarting a service that has visible external effects may not always result
in correct behavior”. So while more carefully designed to isolate client state
that exists in servers and bind that state to the client, this is not sufficient to
ensure recovery. This approach is similar to MicroReboot [15, 14].
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8.2 Recovery Techniques
Recovering from errors has been a concern of programmers as long as there
have been misbehaving hardware, misbehaving software, and users.
8.2.1 Ad-hoc
The first ad-hoc recovery technique is ubiquitous: error codes. Error codes
exist in operating system interfaces [99, 96, 97, 4], in standard libraries [1],
shared libraries [3], and in process termination. Error codes are no more
than a signaling mechanism indicating to the caller that an error needs to be
handled. The state of the faulting system and what actions should be taken
vary as widely as the users of error codes.
Exceptions [2, 5] are a common feature of modern programming lan-
guages. The semantics of exceptions vary widely between languages. They
range from being a signalling and control mechanism in languages such as
Java to also performing basic recovery in languages such as C++. When they
perform recovery they often are limited to destroying objects on the stack
and executing their destructors. This enables the common idiom of “release
on destroy” whereby a resource, such as an open file, is released when the
wrapping object is destroyed. This, however, is not a recovery feature of the
language, but the disciplined use of exceptions to help with recovery. Ex-
ceptions, in practice, even within the same language, are used in different
ways and to different extents by programmers, making it impossible to have
a uniform exception handling regimen across all libraries a program may use.
Further, exceptions are part of the interface to a library forcing the applica-
tion to adopt the library programmer’s exception handling methodology for
those portions of the code which interface with that particular library; other
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libraries may implement and constrain exceptions differently.
8.2.2 Isolation
Isolation is the notion of containing and limiting a portion of the system such
that a fault in it can be dealt with without terminating the entire system. The
most widely deployed form of isolation is the process. A process is, on mod-
ern operating systems, isolated from other processes and the operating system
by the virtual memory management hardware (as controlled by the operat-
ing system). This contains the process state and prevents stray corruption of
other process’ state. Language-level isolation is used by several systems; such
as SPIN [10], Singularity [42, 26], JavaOS [68], SafeDrive [95], SFI [84], and
XFI [83]; to provide isolation to components of an operating system. These
specific systems will be discussed in more depth in Section 8.3.2.
8.2.3 Checkpointing and Rollback
Using checkpoints for fault tolerance is well studied [61, 25] and many mech-
anisms have been proposed for it [46, 13, 67, 79, 88]. While approaches vary
by the fault model they are targeting and the initiator of roll-backs (sensors,
programmer driven, host driven), they must all capture the state of a system
in such a way as to be able to restore the pre-fault state after the fault. There
are limitations associated with how often a fault can be recovered from as
discussed in 8.1. In general, like Recovery Domains, using checkpoint and
rollback for recovery involves a separate fault detection mechanism and rules
governing the restart of the system. Checkpointing and Recovery Domains
both suffer from the output-commit problem: actions that are visible outside
the system.
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Checkpoint-based recovery has to contend with non-determinism in re-
execution: a random event during normal execution will not happen dur-
ing re-execution. How to handle these events which are not recorded in the
checkpoint affect the amount of involvement required of the programmer.
In some cases, such as a random number generator, using a different num-
ber during re-execution may be acceptable. However, a key-press (which is
essentially a random event) should not be lost because of a rollback.
Checkpoints and re-execution have been discussed for use as debugging
aids for a considerable time [94, 27, 8, 11, 18, 75, 82, 81]. Notably, check-
points are used for deterministic debugging by King et. al. in [44] for oper-
ating systems by Srinivasan et. al. in [75] for applications. These systems are
intended as debug aids and are not concerned with the continued execution
of a system, but with allowing programmers to find the root cause of a fault.
Recovery Domains are not concerned with providing a convenient mecha-
nism for debugging a fault, but for recovering a system and continuing after
a fault.
8.2.4 Transactions
Many of the low-level mechanisms we use are borrowed from database
systems. These include the use of undo logs for recovery; the tracking of
dependencies between undo-able operations (domains); the distinction be-
tween “protected” database operations (like Basic Domains), unprotected
operations (Transparent Domains) and “real” operations (Unlogged Do-
mains); and the use of open-nested transactions [54] with “compensating
transactions” [34, 9] (reversible domains with programmer-specified undo
operations).
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Nevertheless, Recovery Domains are novel in several ways. First, none
of the previous transactional systems we know of were designed to achieve
a similar goal, namely recovery of entire systems from unanticipated errors.
Achieving consistent state of a database under expected operating conditions
gives recovery from anticipated errors as a side effect. Recovery from unan-
ticipated, non-fatal errors are not handled however. All fatal errors should
trigger the recovery system, to ensure consistent data, when the database is
restarted. Second, transactional memory systems and database systems in-
tegrate recovery with several other aspects of the system. Recovery from
anticipated errors is integrated with synchronization and data management
to achieve “failure atomicity” and “execution atomicity” because they share
mechanisms for logging, conflict detection, and rollback. Third, databases
transactions focus on the recovery of the data in the database while Recovery
Domains focus on the recovery of the internal state of the system, not on the
data it is managing.
Programming language mechanisms are also being developed to add
transactions to new or existing parallel programs [36, 53], but those mecha-
nisms also are designed for both optimistic concurrency as well as recovery.
In contrast, we introduce recovery mechanisms semi-automatically into an
existing multi-threaded software system where the synchronization mecha-
nisms are pessimistic (e.g., locks, semaphores, or monitors), i.e., they do not
support rollback of program state. Therefore, we have to introduce logging
and rollback into such existing systems, and have to optimize these by taking
advantage of transparent and reversible operations wherever possible. Fur-
thermore, Recovery Domains do all this semi-automatically to minimize the
manual effort expended by the programmer.
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TxLinux [63] exploits transactional memory within an OS kernel to sim-
plify programming of mutual exclusion. It introduces a new primitive called
a cooperative transactional spinlock for combining optimistic and pessimistic
synchronization. It does not aim to improve the recoverability of the OS
kernel in the presence of unanticipated faults, either within or outside critical
sections. Like this work, we could leverage hardware support for transac-
tional memory techniques. We would be using transactions not to replace
locking in the kernel but to replace locking in the run-time.
Locus [86], QuickSilver [38], and TxOS [56] all add transactional seman-
tics to operating system services. These systems do not aim to recover from
internal faultswithin the operating system per se: an unexpected internal ker-
nel error can crash the system just as with an ordinary, non-transactional
kernel. These systems do have primitive mechanisms for rolling back and
restarting intervals of code, but using these mechanisms for fault recovery re-
quires significantly different policies, e.g., (a) treating dependences between
threads as benign and tracking the dependences to identify which intervals
must be rolled back if an error occurs; (b) designing appropriate error re-
porting policies when a request encounters an error and must be rolled back;
(c) designing appropriate, and minimal, annotations to facilitate the design;
and (d) developing optimizations to achieve acceptable performance. The
reference implementation of Recovery Domains addresses (a-c) to achieve
nearly automatic recovery but with arguably prohibitive overhead for pro-
duction use. The optimized implementation addresses (d) by proposing new
compiler optimizations to bring the overheads down to acceptable levels.
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8.3 Recovery Systems
Based on these recovery techniques, many recovery systems have been devel-
oped. The first class of systems we discus extend languages with new features
which explicitly provide enhanced recovery. The second class we investigate
are operating system recovery systems. Some are based on standard check-
pointing techniques, other use various forms of isolation (both hardware and
software) with recovery. Finally, we look at a collection of recovery systems
which are based on extensions to checkpointing.
8.3.1 Language Based
Some programming language extensions or programming models exist to
attempt to improve error handling and the correctness of error return paths.
Recovery Domains generalize and unify these models; these extensions
can be treated as special cases of Recovery Domains, albeit ones with nice
language-level syntax.
Weimer and Necula [85] extend Java exception handlers to have a stack
of “compensation” code to release resources acquired before an exception is
raised. This is motivated by observing that exception handlers rarely pre-
serve invariants (such as lock state) or interface requirements. They present
a language extension and runtime which allow blocks of code to be marked
with compensation code that is executed if an exception unwinds past a given
point. This can be seen as a semantically invertible recovery domain execut-
ing in an unlogged parent domain. While compensation stacks help prevent
high level mistakes during exception handling, they do not provide low-level
guarantees of the state of the program after exceptions.
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Low-level memory state guarantees are provided by Shinnar et. al. [72]
who extend the exception model of C# to support exceptions with memory
undo. Their language extensions also support user defined hooks to undo ar-
bitrary operations. Neither work handles memory dependence tracking and
rollbacks across multiple threads. Without cross-thread rollback, memory
state is still undefined after an exception.
Xu et al. [89] describe a language-agnostic programming model that en-
ables error recovery for concurrent object-oriented programs. They define
mechanisms for cooperative exception handling and (like database systems)
take advantage of transactions in the underlying language for recovery as
well. Since we are recovering commodity operating systems written in assem-
bly and C code, we have neither the luxury of simply extending a language
exception mechanism, nor can we rely on certain programming styles.
Rudys et al. [65] instrument Java code to allow runaway threads to be
stopped without corrupting the runtime. This is done by inserting checks in
loops to check if a thread has been killed. Blocking calls made to native code
spawn a new thread with the original thread waiting on it. With these re-
structurings, a thread can be destroyed even if it is in a system call or runtime
function. The goal of this work is simply to supply the equivalent of ’kill’
for threads that exceed their resource limit without causing the JVM and the
application hosting it to die. In this sense, this work is not concerned about
general recovery, simply recovery from a narrow class of faults. Further, this
work depends on the memory safety of the language implementation. This
contrasts with Recovery Domains which is not meant as a way to terminate
runaway threads in a safe manner but provides inter-thread recovery from
any fault, including potentially resource limitations and infinite loops, given
the correct detector.
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Rudys et al. [66] extend runaway thread termination in [65] to preserve
sane state in the event of a termination. An object-granularity transaction sys-
tem is created and code is transformed to run all tasks in it. They have several
assumptions: all transactions start at thread creation and end at thread termi-
nation, threads are short lived, and threads only handle one request before
they terminate. Consistency of output channels and resources, such as open
file descriptors, are not maintained. If circular dependencies are created, the
youngest thread is killed. The basic approach and set of assumptions is from
studying Java-based servers with general frameworks that create instances of
programmer-supplied classes to handle requests. Overheads range from 6x
to 7x in array light-code to 23x in their worst-case. Recovery Domains are
more general: allowing request nesting, handling circular dependencies with-
out rollback, and not making assumptions about the threading structures of
a program.
8.3.2 OS Architectures for Isolation
The general technique of checkpoint and recovery has been well-studied in
the past [25] and has been applied to operating systems. Bressoud and Schnei-
der use deterministic hypervisor-level replay to replicate the state of a sys-
tem remotely, thus facilitating efficient fail-over recovery for operating sys-
tems [12]. Deterministic replay subjects the system to the potential to ei-
ther save corrupt state or re-execute a fault after rollback as discussed in Sec-
tion 8.1.
The Rio Vista project [52] makes in-memory file-system caches persistent
by using battery-backed RAM, and can use this persistence to recover data
after reboots. I/O Shepherding [35] adds a new layer below the file system
to unify file-system reliability in order to cope with storage faults. These
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recovery systems target a different, narrower category of fault than Recovery
Domains.
Recent projects describe alternative OS architectures that improve fault
isolation by breaking OS-level subsystems into isolated components, thus
isolating faults to a single subsystem. Microkernels [7, 33, 37, 40] run OS-
level subsystems as user-mode server processes with a small underlying ker-
nel. Although this provides memory isolation, if a process is restarted due
to a fault, state is either lost in the traditional microkernel approach or state
is restored, running the risk of restoring corrupted state. The risk of restor-
ing corrupted state is discussed in section 8.1. Microkernels with recovery
capabilities are discussed in 8.1.1. Microkernels pair well with Recovery Do-
mains as microkernels force a very request-oriented structure on the kernel,
dovetailing nicely with the basic unit of recovery in Recovery Domains: a
request.
Virtual machine monitors have been used to isolate device driver faults
from the rest of the kernel [50, 29]. This isolates code which is often buggy,
but does nothing to recover from faults in the core kernel, faults in the VMM,
or state loss by a restarted device driver. These projects use a VMM to provide
isolation, the use of address spaces or instrumentation by systems such as
Nooks [77] is discussed in Section 8.3.2.
Further, projects such as Singularity [42, 26], SPIN [10] and JavaOS [68]
implement operating systems in type-safe languages, eliminating many silent
errors. The projects use the compiler-supported, language-based isolation
provided by memory safety as an important component of their architecture,
but do not extend the language semantics to recover from runtime errors.
Fault recovery in these systems require the correct handling of exceptions by
the programmer rather than being handled in an automatic way as done in
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Recovery Domains.
Recovery Domains is a more general mechanism that is language-agnostic
and targets commodity operating systems and user-space systems. There is
an enormous amount of engineering-hours invested in existing systems and
rewriting all these systems is both unreasonable and too time and resource
consuming to be a practical solution to reducing faults and providing recov-
ery today. Further, these systems mainly provide memory safety, which is
only one type of potential error. Recovery Domains allow recovering from
any error for which a detector exists.
Direct Fault Isolation
In addition to alternative OS architectures, several recent projects focus
on retrofitting commodity operating systems for improved fault isolation.
Nooks [78] implements a driver isolation layer for Linux by using memory-
management hardware to catch errant memory accesses made by buggy
drivers.
Nooks statically wraps kernel extensions and drivers to provide isola-
tion, logging, and recovery. All interactions of an extension are logged by
the wrapper and isolation is enforced by copying kernel objects used by the
extensions into and out of the address space. Nooks takes the isolation and
monitoring approach one step further and rebuilds drivers’ internal state by
replaying driver-level calls after a fault in a device driver [77]. Nooks fo-
cuses on extensions to the kernel, including device drivers and makes rigid
assumptions about their boundaries. Although some code is shared, different
types of extensions require different wrappers. Wrappers for network drivers
must be written which are separate from wrappers for sound cards or wrap-
pers for file systems. Recovery Domains are request-oriented and are defined
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by their entry points, subsuming any executed code in-between. This makes
them simple to specify and uniform across the entire system, not specific
to each subsystem. Further, complex interactions between components and
extensions are naturally incorporated into a request. One of Nooks’ most
interesting features is its ability to restore sane state to a hardware device by
replaying requests to the hardware. Recovery Domains are flexible enough
to allow incorporation of Nooks for interacting with hardware devices. Re-
covery Domains are always on and cover the entire code base, including the
core kernel and are not limited to extensions.
Like Nooks, SafeDrive [95] isolates drivers from the rest of the operat-
ing system, but SafeDrive uses language-level mechanisms on legacy C code
to enforce memory isolation. SVA [21] uses language-level mechanism on
legacy C code to enforce fine-grained memory safety for entire kernels, and
XFI [83] uses binary instrumentation to interpose on memory accesses for
OS extensions to enforce isolation.
SafeDrive [95] adds type annotations, in the form of bounds informa-
tion, to Linux drivers. The source is then type-checked and transformed
by the compiler to enforce those types. This provides software-based isola-
tion. Safedrive recovers from type-safety violations by assuming a driver is
restartable. SafeDrive logs specific actions, such as registering device names
or new filesystems, and undoes them to restart the driver. However, not
all global state changes are logged, only state updated though well defined
mechanisms provided by the kernel. Thus a driver directly accessing core
kernel data structures can leave the kernel in an inconsistent state after recov-
ery. SafeDrive, like Nooks, has only been evaluated with drivers (which are
extensions with well-defined interfaces).
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Vino [69] protects a kernel from errant extensions (not drivers) by imple-
menting software fault isolation to limit fault propagation and transactions
to recover. All access to the kernel by extensions are mitigated through ac-
cessors functions with associated undo operations. These are logged as part
of the transaction preventing the transaction from needing to log operations
performed by the core kernel on behalf of an extension. Vino is a specially
designed operating system, not an attempt to provide recovery to commodity
systems like Recovery Domains, Nooks, and SafeDrive do.
These projects are complementary to this work; they focus on drivers and
extensions. Projects such as Nooks provide a more powerful mechanism for
reasoning about hardware interaction than recovery domains at the cost of
having to write wrappers for each class of device driver. Recovery Domains
supply recovery to the entire kernel, though may not always recover from a
fault in a request which modifies device state. A combination of strong driver
specific recovery, such as Nooks provides, to enable recovery for requests
with low-level hardware accesses and Recovery Domains to enable recovery
to the rest of the system would be a very powerful and comprehensive recov-
ery system.
8.3.3 Extending Checkpoints
Checkpoints have many variations for automatic recovery.
MicroReboot
A variation on checkpointing and isolation is to isolate data from code
while having stateless components. MicroReboot [15] maintains separate
and consistent state for Java objects and can restart individual object without
restarting the entire application. On a fault, just the faulting components are
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restarted. This is, in spirit, the application level version of microkernels with
data-isolation, such as those discussed in 8.1.1. This approach to recovery
requires the redesign of applications and suffers from limitations similar to
those shown in 8.1.1, namely potentially saving corrupted state.
Environment Changing
A further variation on checkpointing aimed at recovery, as done by Qin et.
al. [60], is to change the environment in which a system is operating. If a
fault is triggered, rollback and re-execution occurs but something is changed.
Many things may be changed, such as memory initialization, delaying frees,
padding allocations, reordering messages, adjusting scheduling, changing sig-
nal delivery, dropping network requests, etc. This approach, like most check-
pointing approaches, also risks saving corrupt state. If state is corrupted and
checkpointed far enough in advance of a symptom of a bug being manifest,
the system will not be able to recover. Further, if the manifestation of a bug
is not caught during re-execution yet the bug was triggered, recovery will er-
roneously succeed. As the set of environment changes increases, the set of
possible changes the system can make becomes the power set of the set of
changes. This means that a sufficiently complex implementation (one with
many ways to change the environment) must have heuristics to prune the
search space, which may cause it to miss a combination of changes that would
avoid the bug.
8.3.4 Reducing Functionality
Systems based on error virtualization, such as ASSURE [74, 73] use error vir-
tualization in much the same way as Recovery Domains. ASSURE was con-
currently developed and was published in the same conference as recovery
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domains [49]. ASSURE differs from recovery domains in several key aspects.
First, with ASSURE, recovery points are determined by off-line analysis us-
ing fuzzing. Operating-system-supported checkpointing is used to snapshot
the system at recovery points. In the event of a detected fault, the most cur-
rent (or older if necessary) checkpoints are re-executed on a shadow machine.
Re-execution searches for a recovery point which can be used as an error vir-
tualization point. A rescue point is accepted by the re-execution search and
the production binary is patched at the error to use it if the recovery point
allows the application to continue, not change semantics, and process further
requests. The use of binary patching allows ASSURE to be used on existing
binaries, rather than requiring recompilation as Recovery Domains do. The
systems differ in where application specific knowledge is stored. ASSURE
stores it in the recovery systems, while Recovery Domains store the informa-
tion in the original system’s code base. These reflect the differing goals of the
two systems. ASSURE focuses on recovery for binary applications, whereas
Recovery Domains focus on recovery for systems which will be recompiled
to use the recovery system.
Failure-oblivious computing [62] instruments C code with checks to en-
sure memory safety. At runtime, if a memory safety condition is violated,
such as an out of bound store or a load, no memory state is changed but
execution continues with a fabricated value.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
Recovery from faults is important for reliable systems. This dissertation pro-
poses and evaluates Recovery Domains – a practical approach to recovery
from faults in request-oriented operating systems. Recovery Domains pro-
vide a low overhead method of enabling recovery from faults detected by
automated fault detectors with minimal changes to an operating system ker-
nel.
Recovery of operating systems is a difficult problem subject to several
important constraints, namely,
• Operating system recovery must work with commodity systems with
few changes. There is a massive investment in developing modern op-
erating systems; operating systems such as Linux and Microsoft Win-
dows have estimatedminimum development costs ranging tomore than
a billion dollars [87, 30]. Developing a new operating system or mak-
ing major architectural changes to an existing one thus is prohibitively
expensive.
• Recovery must work with commodity operating systems without
changing the interface to the operating system. There is a broad range
of application software built upon the ubiquitous commodity operating
systems. Changing all these systems is not feasible, so to supply im-
proved reliability for these systems, recovery must not require changes
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to the interface they interact with.
• Recovery must work with the entire operating system. Faults can oc-
cur in any portion of an operating system. Automated tools to protect
against faults can cause faults in locations which are unanticipated by
the original programmer. A recovery system must be able to handle
faults anywhere.
This dissertation presents Recovery Domains as a way to provide re-
covery to operating systems subject to these constraints. Recovery Domains
attempt to meet the ideal recovery system presented in Chapter 2.2 subject
to some inherent constraints. These goals are met, with the noted limitations,
by Recovery Domains, as summarized:
Automatic recovery: Recovery Domains provide completely automatic re-
covery from the point a fault detector triggers recovery. The work
of recovery happens in the Recovery Domains runtime and compiler
transforms handle the instrumentation of the system to use the recovery
system. All details of runtime monitoring happen without programmer
intervention.
For the entire system: Recovery Domains provide recovery for almost the
entire operating system. A few things, such as the core scheduler and
early boot code are implicitly trusted. The programmer can exclude
some additional code paths from protection by making them unlogged
domains, but this is not required by the system.
Minimal porting effort: Recovery Domains require some, though minimal,
porting effort. Request boundaries and how to deal with an error after
recovery require manual annotation, but this annotation burden is very
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low (a couple hundred lines of code for a code base of over four million
lines in Linux 2.6).
For commodity systems: Recovery Domains are suitable for commodity
systems. This is demonstrated with two ports of architecturally dif-
ferent versions of the Linux kernel and no reason is known that they
should not be usable unmodified on other commodity systems, such as
Windows, OS X, or the BSDs.
Recover from detected errors of any type: Recovery Domains are agnostic
to the type of error that triggers rollback. A fault detector is neces-
sary to detect faults and trigger rollback, but that is beyond the scope
of Recovery Domains. Recovery Domains were inspired by real fault
detectors and is designed to work with them.
Recovery not usable as a denial of service: RecoveryDomains do not com-
pletely mask the existence of a fault. Faults are reported to the initiator
of a request. This allows higher-level, existing logic to deal with the
fault. The fault is masked from other tasks in the system. Because there
is no automatic retry mechanism, faults will not keep reoccurring due
to the recovery system.
Clear semantics: Recovery Domains have clear semantics. Both the action
and aftermath of recovery and execution under non-faulting conditions
is specified.
Recovery Domains, as an organization for operating system recov-
ery, are a close match to common operating system architecture. The
implementation-independent design of the recovery system is given in Chap-
ter 3. Recovery is organized around the notion of request, recognizing that
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requests can in themselves issue requests. Recovery Domains allow for the
notion of context-independent requests to allow semantic recovery for re-
quests which can be logically undone (rather than restoring memory state)
and do not depend on the state of the requester. Recovery Domains track de-
pendencies between themselves and other executing domains to ensure that
consistent state is used by the entire system. This enables recovery or multi-
ple threads, even if shared state is corrupted. Recovery Domains have a clear
and simple programming model which does not require many modifications
to a system.
We developed a reference design and implementation of Recovery Do-
mains suitable for a standard operating system. This design appears in chap-
ter 4. This implementation is based on memory versioning, undo logging, and
a dependence graph. Memory versioning allows finding dependency infor-
mation between domains based on reads and writes. Undo logging provides
for restoring memory state in the event of a fault by restoring the initial or last
committed contents to modified memory locations. The dependency graph
records dependencies found at runtime by the memory versioning between
active domains. The graph encodes the information necessary to determine
when a domain may commit. The system was implemented in LLVM. Linux
2.4.22 was ported to the system and we measured the survivability, overhead,
and coverage of the system. We found that the system could recover from, on
average, 33 consecutive faults. The overhead ranged from 8% to 460%. The
fraction of memory operations executed in recoverable domains ranged from
97% for kernel intensive code to 31% for code which spent most of its ker-
nel time handling interrupts (the timer interrupt was marked as an unlogged
domain).
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Building on the reference implementation, we integrate compiler analysis
and optimizations, as well as runtime analysis and optimizations, to dramat-
ically lower the overhead of Recovery Domains. Analysis of the dynamic
state of the dependence graph provides opportunities to elide monitoring of
reads. When memory is protected by locks, we can use the memory version
on the lock as a proxy for the locations covered by the lock and avoid ver-
sioning those locations while the lock is held. Memory which is allocated but
has not become visible to other requests needs no instrumentation. These op-
timizations combine to lower Recovery Domains overhead to less than 15%
in all but one test case.
Finally, since Recovery Domains require a fault detector, we give a spec-
ulative integration of the memory safety detector of SVA with Recovery Do-
mains. A couple of cases are noted, for example stack object registration,
which require additional work, beyond simply combining the transforms and
runtimes, to maintain consistent meta-data in the SVA runtime. SVA and lat-
ter work on that platform, provide solutions to many of the potential sources
of corruption to the recovery meta-data that could prevent correct recovery.
This example integration provides a picture of a complete system which com-
bines fault detection with automatic recovery.
Recovery Domains provide a compelling, practical, and easy to use sys-
tem for recovering from faults in commodity operating systems. We hope
that it inspires programmers to make more reliable systems; safety tool de-
signers to not just detect faults in their designs, but use Recovery Domains to
recover from the detected faults; and researchers to continue exploring recov-
ery. Ultimately though, we hope through this work and continuing work in
this area that people come to expect computer systems to be reliable and that
the tools and techniques to make that happen come into wide-spread use.
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